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CHAPTER I 
·~'. 
lN'rRODUCTIOl.J" 
• J t ' 
An intelligent understanding of international relation-
ships requires a special study of the critical places where 
continuous crisis arises. It was felt, therefore, desirable 
to examine a significant aspect of the conflict between the 
.A ~ab ':!orld and the State of Israel that provides the subject 
of this study. 
. . 
'fhe economic boycott of Israel ms assumed a Grave 
significance in interna tional relations, yet to the author's 
knowledge this subject has not been investigated in a 
scholarly and comprehensive mam1er in any available publi-
•J 
cation. 'l1he writer embarks on this topic in the hope that 
' it may provide the American student of ~1iddle Eastern 
affairs with the essential data for its clear understanding. 
When t~e Arab boycott started officially, in 1950, 
most of the Hestern authorities tended to regard it as of 
minor importance. Its wider significance was brought home 
to them, when in April, 1960, American longshor~men. refus~d 
to ur1load the United Arab Republic passenger-cargo ship 
2 
11 Cleopatra 11 at Hew York harbor.* In response, harbor workers 
throughout the Arab World, refused to unload any American 
ships a t their seaports. This double boycott naturally 
t hreatened to provoke ~~ension between .the ·Arab ~tates and 
the United Sta tes, indicating the dangerous international 
repercus sions of the ~rab boycott of Israel. 
It s e ems obvious . ~hat the problem of Ar ab-Isreaeli 
r e l a tion s should be of some relevance to the American 
student of international relations. The United States has 
gre~t economic , strategic, and politica l interests in the 
Arab world, supposedly one of the na tura l defence outposts 
of .Jestern democracy. 
while the usual books and periodicals have bee n 
used in prepa ration of the present study, the ma in source 
materia l wa s provided by United Na tions documents and , 
part icularly, orig inal documents in Arabic em~~ating from 
the various authorities directing the boycott and 
~navailable in English. Besides t hese and other Arabic 
material, documents from Israeli s ources, too, have been 
used. \ihile 1 t is not cla i med that t his survey is 
exhaustive, 1 t is hoped tha t it might provide the ·•merican 
*1his att itude towards this Ar ab ship was noticed by 
the Ar c:1 b Press , and linked by i t t o the visit of Isr aeli's 
.Prime .1'1inister {Ben Gurian} to t he United St ates in Harch, 
1960, t ha t is, a few weeks before the boycott of the 
"Cleopatra " \'las proclaimed. 
J 
reader with a factual survey and the vital data unobtainable 
elsel&~here. ~ .. .l., 
Since for an understanding of this problem it is 
•. . ' I • 
imperative to have some knowledge of the history and back-
ground of Palestine and of the Arab League - the chief agent 
"'~ ft .. • • ' I "' ' 
for the boycott of Israel - these two subjects were chosen 
.· 
as an introduction to the main theme • 
• t 
' ~ I I ' 
(I 
t;. ' 
' (. ... 
. , ... 
. . ~ I :• 
. . .; . ' : ~ 
l• ( 
• .. • t 
I ' 
.•r ... ., I, 
I I 
... l ' ...  ~ .. ...... 
BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS 
.. 
The problem of Palestine was created during and after 
the First viorld l-Iar. The ma in cause was the conflict between 
I ~I 
political Zionism which wished to turn Palestine into a 
Jewish state and the Arabs who formed the vast majority of 
Palestine's inhabitants, anxious to preserve the Arab 
... 
char acter of their country and to continue living there. 
Although Palestine has ha d ~ separate existence since 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, geographically it is 
pE.rt of Syria, a single region 1.-1hich stretches from the 
southern edge of the Anatolian Plateau down to ~inai and 
from the Meditranean to the 3yrian and Arabian deserts. 
After 1918 this area was divided by the British and 
French governments into four reg ions: Palestine, '1'rans-
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In spite of this political and 
administrative division it still retained its geographic, 
.. 
national and historical Wlity, characterized by common 
features of climate, vegetation and phyeica l structure and 
. , 
by the presence of an indigenous Ar ab population that shares 
t .. 
the same language and historical and cultural bahkground.l 
!I 
Moreover, Palestine has always played an essential 
lFou'ad No'shi, Palestine in the Battle, Cairo, Egypt, 
May, 1958, p. 10. 
part in the religious life of the Huslims.; who regarded 
Jerusa lem as their holiest city at'ter l'lecca and Nedina. 
, 
One of the Islamic holiest, shrines, the Dome of the liock 
in Jerusalem, was created by the Umayyad Caliph Abd~l 
r·1alik Ibn Norwan more tha~. a thousand years ago, that is, 
in 691 A.D. 
5 
Its Arab population descended froJU the indigenous 
inhabitants, who had been. in the country .since the earliest 
. . . 
recorded time, who were _ ~here whe~ , t~e .Jews entered it in 
Biblical times, anq ~~~ ~ent on livin~ in it after ~he 
Jewish dispersioi)-.1 Th~ cou~~ry bec?-me completely Arabised 
and integrated in. the Arab ~~orld in the 5th Century B.C. 
... . ' . 
·rhe Jewish political connection with Palestine had almost 
..... .. 
come to an end 2,000 ,Y~ars ago in the fi:rs.t century A.D. 
At no time during .those 2,000 ye a rs did the Jews form more 
. . . 
than a small minority oft the populatio~ • .. 
In 1917 -Palestine was and has been for 1,300 years, 
an .B.rab country - of its population of about 650,000, more 
than 6oo,ooo, or about . 90% were r.rabs and only about 45,090 
were Jews. Of the lt?,OOO Jews who lived in .. i·alestine ii?-. 
1917, many ~ere long e~~ablished ci~izens who had become 
Arabised themselves. and lived at peace with Huslim and 
Christian : rabs.2 
' , . . e'-
2Ja mal Nasir, A. Day of Justice., Jerusalem, Jordan, 
1956 , p . 7. 
6 
The last Eu~ope9-n J~lif~ who came to· .. Palestine during 
the preceding 40 years, ~ had, no political ambitions, their • 
presence in Palestine having, been motivated exclusively by 
. . . 
relig ious considerations. 
'l'he political challenge to -.. the Palestine Arabs did 
' . 
not, therefore, come from the local Jewish Community in 
Palestine merely as a symbolic spiritu~l home. 
There were other Jews, however, who believed that 
if their race was to fulfill its mission in the world it 
must preserve and expand the Jewish heritage in Palestine; 
and, finally, there was a group for which spiritual and 
cultural considerations counted for less than did nat.ional 
and political ones. This group believed that .Palestine 
should become the home of all the Jews persecuted in the 
countries in wh~ch they h~ppened to live and, finally, of 
all Jews. Gradually, ~twas the political national -element 
within Zionism that succeeded to determine the policies of 
the movememt. 
't 
It is, therefore, e~sential to , sketch out, however 
briefly, the sequ~nce of _events that Jled. to the est~blish­
ment of the State of Israel. 'l'he ! decisive phase in that 
story is represent~d : bY what has come to be \known as the 
Husse in-l1acf1ahon ... Correspondence. 
I ' ' 
,, 
During World War I (1914-191$}, ~urkey sided with the 
Central Powers. England knew that Turkey was the weakest 
1 ~·-
; .. :.J .... 
7 
of four and her· COllapse I d8uld ~ weaken;· Or ·even lead tO ·the 
uefent of Germany, BulgariB and Austria. · Knowing the Arabs 
had numerous grievances ·against ' the Turks ·and· exploiting 
stirrings of nationalism nmong• the educated young, Great 
•·J ~ o I, 0 .. # f ,, Britain encouraged the Arab ·to revolt against the -Turks. 
?a:OMI ~"iES 
Sir Henry· MacMahon, Kitchener's successor in Egypt 
vli th the title of High Commissioner, began corresponding .. 
\•.;i th King Hussein of Hecca and the guardian of the Holy 
.Pl aces of Islam, in the hope of enlisting hi's support for 
the a llied cause .3 The Hussein-Naci1ahbn. correspondence 
began on ~uly 14, l9J~ and continued until January; JO,' 1916 . 
. \ '• . ) . 
In this correspondence Great Britain declared· he r willing-
. t 1 
ness to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arab 
' ~' \ 
countries and their inhabitants and her readiness to 
J 
approve an Arab Caliphate upon its proclaimation. After 
l ~ 
some negotiation King Hussein outlined the territory of the 
proposed Ara}? State as stretching from the .i1ed Sea to the 
~ledi terranean, north to the Bay of Alexandrette, east to 
the Persian frontier and fina lly south to the Persian Gulf. 
l ~ ' t ' 
'l'he British expressed certa in reservations in the interests 
of their a~ly, France, especially about the two Vilayets, 
·' . 
.· 
Juom Landau, Islam and the Ar abs, George . llen and 
Um-1 in Ltd., Woking and London, 1958 , p. 240. 
8 
Aleppo and Beirut, but t therEr ·was no doubt in Arabs minds 
.• ·• lr 
tha t Pa lestine fel·l within the territories agreed upon as 
1 • ' ' t ,.. I •• • , •":) \ 
belong ing to -the \ Arabs. l T~e l Sha~if, convinced tha t his 
) I • 
proposa ls had 'been accepted, · -gave the signal for revolt, and 
\! • I • \ ' I • ' 
the 11r a bs threw their lot with the British against the 
'l'urks. 
On the other side, Britain, France and Gza rist 
Hussia opened discussions on the dismemberment of the 
Ottoma n Empire and a division of the spoils. 'rhe agree~ent 
•-I 
rea che d during these discussions is known as the Sykes-
Picot Agreement. It was concluded in London on May 16, 1916.4 
Professor Hom Landau in his book Islam ~ the Hrab said : 
In this agreement many of the promises 
g iven to Hussein were disregarded by the big 
powers, while prepared to recognize an 
independent Arab St a te or -confedera tion of 
Arab State, the three powers were guar anteeing 
one another certain rights in areas that the 
MacMahon correspondence had either ex-plicitly 
or implicitly promised to the Arab.5 
. ; 
A few months later, on November 2 ; 1917, the British 
government issued the statement destined to become 
historic as the ~Balfour Declaration:n 
4aeorg~ Antonius,· ~ Ar ab Awakening, Hamish 
Hamilton, Lqndon, 1938, p. 244. 
..... 
•c:... • \ •• ~.1 • 
5aom Dandau, QQ. cit., p. 24). 
t' 
His 1-l~jesty ',s Q.overnment view \ii th. favour 
the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and will use their 
best ende&vours to facilitate the achievement 
of this object., it being clearly understood 
that nothing shall be done tlhich may pre judice 
the civil and religiqus rights of exist~ng non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights 
and political ijtatus ·enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country.6 
9 
In this statement the .i3ritish government had promised 
the Jews a "national home" in i"'alestine, a · Palestine tha t 
.. 
was to have formed a part of the new /,rab Kingdom. 
• I 
It was not until December 1917 the Arabs received 
. . 
through the f urks, the text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
'· 
and King rlussein expressed his alarm by asking his ally, 
Great Britain, for an explanation. In its reply of 
February 8, 1918, His Ma jesty's ~ove~nment tried to set 
. 
his mind at rest by informing him 
• • • that the Turkish policy is to create 
dissension by luring .the arabs i!1to believing 
that the Allied Powers have designs on the 
Arab countries. His . ffiajesty's Government 
reaffirm their former pledge in regard to 
the liberation of t~e Arab people~ ••• 7 
THE MANDA'l$ AND THE COMHISSION :- . 
In November 1918, at the .. end of, \~orld \•Jar I, the 
4-, 
______ ..;,__ """ .. :., , ,, • t-
. n .. ' L I . • • !-. 
6J. C. Hurewi tz, Diplomacy in the ,Hear and fUddle 
East, Vol. II, p. 26. 
7Quoted by ftom Landau, QQ. cit., p. 243. 
10 
British were in militar~ :contro~ ' of Palestine, the l a rger 
part of Syria and the whole o~ Iraq, . the French had oc-
cupied Beirut, ·the Lebanon and Syrian· coust, including 
Cilicia. Shortly before the. end of hostilities, on 
Hovernber 7, 1918, Britain and France reiterated their good 
intentions toward_ the .Ar.abs.. They. declared that they 
were working for the final liberation o£ the peoples who 
had for so long been . oppressed by the Turks and would set 
up national governments and administrations which would 
derive their authority from the . f.ree exercise of the 
initiative and choice of the. indigenouB population. l ' 
However the British and French military occupations in 
the area remained in force, ostensibly to continue until 
a final settlement could be reached at a general peace 
conference. 
Prince Faisal the son~ of King Hussein, who had 
been large ly responsible for directing the .Arab revolt, 
arrived in Europe to t ake part in the Peace Conference 
at Versailles. He WR.S snubbed by the French l'lho had no 
desire to recognize him, and was received only coolly 
r., i • ~ . 
by the Brrtish, and on January 1, 1919, he sent a 
memorandum, to the Supreme Council at Paris Peace Conference 
. 
in which ne made a strong plea for the preservation of the 
11. 
essential unity or· the Arab' world.8 . ) .. 
'rhe Zionist organization also sent a memorandum to the 
Supreme Council·· at · the Paris Peace Conference; which, in 
fact, was a draft resolution for the future Mandate of 
Palestine. · It 'was based on the Dalfour Declaration but 
a dded that the Mandatory should administer the country in 
such a manner as to render the creation of an autonomous 
commomfealth posslble.9 J 
When Prince Faisal realized that ·his plea.was not 
heeded, he urged the Peace Conference to send at least a 
commission of inquiry to Syria and Palestine in order to 
as certain the wishes of the populace. Thus started the 
long line of commissions which repeatedly studied the 
problem and usually came up with similar findings, but with 
d ifferent recommendations. ~ · "· 
'fhe first commission \'fe.s the King-Crane , Commission, 10 
whose report wa s published on August 28, 1919. 
8Hurewitz, QQ. cit., Vol. II, pp. J8-J9. 
9Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 45-SO. 
lOceorge Antonius, ££• cit., Recommendation of the 
King-Crane Commission with negard to Syria-Palestine and 
Iraq. Appendix H. p. 44). 
-~ .· 
12 
However, mention should first be made here of the 
General Syrian Congress which assembled in July 1919, in 
• ' 'f ' , .. ~ I' 
Da ma scus and demanded a full and absolute\ political 
independence for Syria , understood to be the territory from 
I 
the Taurus Rbnge to , a· line somewhat . s outh of Gaza to the 
. ~ . ·• 
Gulf of Agaba, and Syria to be a constitutional monarchy 
. 
·' based on democratic princ i ples and tha t Amir Faisa l sha ll 
be the ir king, and they will reject the . idea of a mandate 
a s they believe that the Arab i~abitants of ~yria ar e not 
•• less fitted or gifted to govern themselves e.s certa in 
A 
othere nations (Bulgarians, Serbs, Rumanians) when gr ant ed 
... 
independence. 
Theresolutions stated: 
. ... 
'• . ( 
If, however, the Peace Conference should 
insist on establishing a Ioiandate, we ask the 
United States of America to be the manda t ory powe r , 
for a period not exceeding 20 years , and if the 
United States should find herself unable to 
accede to our request. for assistance, then Grea t 
Britain should be given the Mandate. We do not 
recognize that the Brench government has any right 
to any part of Syria. We reject claims of t he 
Zionist for the establishment of a Jewish com-
monwealth in the part of southern Syria which is 
known as Palestine.ll 
The King-Crane Commission submitted .a very detailed 
report which contained many fruitful suggestions, recom-
mendations and wernings of i mpending danger. Here are 
llG. :mtonius : QE. cit., nesolution of the Genera l 
Syrian Congress, ,.,ppendix G. p. 440. --
:;or.:e of the points: 
,,r . . . 
i-Je recom.t:lelld tha t the un1 ty of ::.;yria be 
:preserved, ln ,accorda.nce ·with the ea~uest 
petition of the J reat majority of the people 
of ,.,)yrla. 
,It is ·COncci vable ' thl'lt .. elrcumstances 
mi'ght drive the' peace conference to SO!ne 
such form of di vi<ted munclate, but it is not 
a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from 
tha. point of vie\i of the larger iucerests of 
the people. 
1'hf3 commissioners urge, therefo.t'e, for 
the largest future ~ood or all groups and 
regions like, the placing of the whole of 
~yria ·~uer n ,s1ngle mandate. 
A national hallie for the . Jewish people 
is not cquiv~lent to making Palestine into 
a Jewish state; nor cun the erection of such 
a Jewish state be accomplished without the 
gravest trespass upon ·the civil and 
religious rights or exist.i:ug non-Jewl.sh 
communities. 
If the principle of aelf-determination ) 
1~ to rule and ' the wishes or Puleatine arc 
to be decisive u.s to what is to oo· ttone 
with Palestine, then it is to be re~embered 
thut the no1~-Jew111h population of Palestine--
nearly nine-tenths of the whole--are 
emphatically against the entire Zionist 
pro,sram. The Peace Conference s hould not . 
shut its eyes to the faet ~that the anti-
Zionist feeling in .Palestine and !Syria is 
intense and not lightly ~o .be • flouted.l2 
Uesp~ te this, England. .Jlnd J-'rance continued with 
their plans and igno~d .the unity of the Arab liorld. '.fh'e 
12Ibid 
-·· 
Appendix 11.:. 
.c .. .. 
- ··!_ .. 
.-.) . 
.. • I .. .. -! .. ~ \ 
./ 
lJ 
14 
. ' . 
decisions taken by the Supreme Council of the Allied powers 
on April 2~ 192~ at San · atm~ spelled disaster for the Arabs.l3 
. ' Syria was to be broken up into three separate entities, 
• f ... ,
Palestine, the Lebanon, 'and a "r~duced • Syria, consisting of 
what was left. Iraq was to remain undivided. The mandates 
were distributed to suit the interests of England and France. 
Syria and Lebanon were given to France; Palestine, including 
Transjordan, and Iraq went to Great Britain. To the Arabs 
this was the "Great Betrayai.wl4 
The · Arabs belleved that the Palestine I1andate was 
devised under the influence of the Zionists as an appropriate 
means to give effect to the "Balfour Declaration.n During 
the thirty years that ensued, with the' British supervising 
immigration,about 600,000 Jews entered the country, so that 
by 1948 Jews c'omprised one-third of the population. 
I " (I 
Zionist immigration led to disturbances which 
increased in violence, and in 1939 'the British Government 
announced that the 11national home• already existed; Jewish 
immegration would cease after 'admitting 'another 75,000 persons; 
and that Palestine would become independent within ten 
years.l5 The Zionists condemned the statement as treachery 
t ".,. I 
' r l3~ •• 'pp. 305-306. 
14Sha1kh f·1. Hussein Naseff-Al-Hussein Ibn Ali, Cairo, 
Egypt, 1926, p. 28.. .. --
15Nevill Barbour: Nisi Dominus, London, 1946, p. 147. 
15 
and began to attack government ~ersonnel and installations 
which culminated in July 1946 with the blowing up of King 
David Hotel in Jerusalem. One hundred persons connected 
with the Palestine Administration were killed by the explo-
sion.l6 
" • \ 'f .. 
LOUDON CONFERENCE ,· 
On September 9, 1946 - the conference convened; 
neither the Jewish Agency for Palestine nor Palestinian 
Ar abs had accepted the invitation, but it was attended· by 
r epresenta tives of the Arab States and the Secretary General 
of the Hrab League. IJ .. " 
·' .. . .. 
No agreement could be reached· and the conference 
adjourned a t the beginning of October ru1d did not reassemble 
until January 27, 1947. . . : . · .. \ 
On February 7, 1947, the British delegation submitted 
new proposals which provided for a five-year period of 
British trusteeship independence ~ When these proposa ls also 
were rejected, the British Government decided it had had 
~nough. 
On February 18, 1947, the Foreign Secretary announced 
tha t His Majesty's Governa~nt had decided, as no other 
course was open for reconciling the conflicting points 
16Jamal Nasir, QQ. Q!i., pp . 17-18. · 
·-
between Arabs and the tjJews ; to subm1:t ' the' whole problem to 
the United Na tiona ,17 · ;- ... 'l ~ . 
. (...~ ·.·: ~ t\ 1t.l. 1: , •r. • .. , .• ... ~. J • • 
UNrrED NATION DECISiON .;. 1 · .• 1 ; l. -\ 
On November 29', ·1947; the General Assembly adopted the 
Palestine Partition Plan which provided for the. establishment 
of a 0 Jewish State". and "Arab s 'tate" •' andan International 
Zone of Jerusalem, The plan gave the "Jewish State" 56% of 
the total area of Palestine, including the fertile coastal 
plains and rich belt, leaving 44% for the 0 Arab State• · and 
Jerusalem International Zone, -~~ ' 'c' •• 
1rhe Partition Resolution stipulated tha't the Jewish 
and the Arab State were to· come into being two months after 
the date of termination of the t1andate ', which the British 
Government had declared would take plac~ · on May 15, 1948. 
In addition, the resolution provided for the establishment 
of a Palestine Commission wf tn the responsibility of t aking 
over administration as the Mandatory Power withdrew and in 
due time hand over this responsibility to respective govern-
ments.l8 ., ! , 'I t• .., \ . -• ' t 
l?Palestine, A, Study ' of ·Jewish~,. Arab, and British· 
Policies, published for Jthe ESCO Foundation for Palestine, 
Inc. Vol. II, pp. 37-38. 
lBu. N. Resolution No. 181 (ll) of 29th November, 
. 17 
'fhe Arabs rejectff~' the Partition because they 
ma inta ined that the~ United Nations had no jurisdiction to 
partition countries and requested that the matter be refer-
red to the International Court· of Justice for an expres-
sion of opinion as ' to the legal aspects of the case. Their 
rejection of the proposal -was also due to the fact that the 
population of the nJewish Staten was to be 50 per cent 
Arab and 50 per cent Jewish, with the Jews owning less than 
ten per cent of . the total land area.l9 1' 
'rhe United Natrona t pied to protect the Ar abs of the 
proposed "Jewish State• by providing that _their civil, 
politica l, economic, religious, and property rights were in 
no way to be prejudiced by the partition. But shortly after 
the partition resolution was adopted on November 29, 1947, 
the Zionists began a campaign of ~ terror 'aimed at expelling 
the Mos~em and Christian inhabitants, confiscating Arab 
property without consideration, and occupying as much of 
Pal e stine as they could before the British left . 20 
'£he United Nations became alarmed at the violence 
tha t was taking place in Palestine; and in r~arch, 1948, 'met 
19Sami Hadawi, Palesti ne Partitioned -~~- 122§ ( Excerpt~ Documents), New York, 1959. 
20Ibid., p. 17. . · ·· · 
' .. .. ,. 
18 
to reconsider the partition, and there was talk of voiding 
# l i\!.. ''( ~ 
it and making all of Palestine a United Nations trl;lsteeship.2l 
&. \ ~} rl.) .# ';. ~ ... (. 
As the date of British withdrawal approached, and 
"' • • I • • • o :..:• .~ • 
fearing that the United Nations would alter its partition, 
,. J J r# 4o ' '\.. I 
the Zionist underground forces--which later formed the 
l I • o • ~ o o o I 
Israeli Army--intensified their attacks against Arab towns 
··~ ;, ,~ . 'n~ ~ 
and villages. On April 9, 1948°, they at tacked the Arab 
• 0; ... • - 10 
village of Deir Yasin and massacred 250 men, women and 
0 ! • . 0 
children. This had the effect of creating panic among the 
. '. (.. 
Arab inhabitants who began to flee w~th n<? fixed destination 
in view.22 
'fhe result: Before the ~ritish had left and before 
a single soldier from any Arab State was on Palestine soil, 
'0 ' . \. ~ . . . 
the Zionists had occupied territory reserved for the DArab 
. 
State" and the "International Zone of Jerusalem" as well as 
the area assigned to the •Jew~sh State• while over JOO,OOO 
Palestine Arabs were refugees in adjacent Arab countries. 
'fhe Palestine Arabs appeale~ to the Arab $tates, and 
\, . 
on Nay 15, 1948 the Arab League cabled the ....;ecretary Qeneral 
• • ; ... '\ I 
of the United Nations and informed him that the Arab States 
• 0 
21
clyde Eagleton, llnnual Heview of United Hations 
Affairs , New York University Press , 1949, p. 15J. 
, 
. - . 
22M iller Burrows • Pales t ine is Our Business , 'rhe 
loJestminster Press, Philadelphia, 193'0, P. 68. 
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"were compelled to iritervene ·in Pa lestine because the 
dis t urbnnces there cona~ituted a serious and direct threat 
• l t • 
to pe~ce and security in· their · territories and in order to 
restore peace and · establish law in · Palestine.•2J . 
Count Bernadotte~of1 Swedent was~appointed United 
Hations Mediator and entrusted with' the task of first 
t erminating hostilities \a rid ·'tHen arranging for a peace 
settlement. On September 17, 1948, he was assassinated by 
the Israelis in Jerusalem;24 · .~ 
In December 1948, the ~nited Nations met and 
resolved that the refugees wishing to return to their homes 
should be permitted to do so and that ·compensation should 
be paid for the property of those not choosing to return. 
At the same time, the Unit"&d .Nations appointed a '·Palestine 
conciliation commission and entrusted it with the ' task of 
settling the dispute. • t .. "" I .. A meeting was called 'by the com~s-
sion in Lausanne; Switzerland; ~and on May 12 ;· 1949, a 
"protocol" wa s signed whereby=Israel and the Arab States 
undertook to settle the Palestine problem within the frame-
work cf the 1947 Partition Plan. But no sooner was Israel 
accepted into the membership of the United Hations, when her 
.. 
.... ,. . , ! ~ .... 
" .. 
2Js. Hadawl, QQ. cit., p. 14. 
24I1illar Burrows, l.2R· . ill· , p. 69. . 
',; 
· .. 
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leaders repudiated ·their signature . 25 · 
The United Nations has not ceased to remind Israel of 
he r obligations under •the United !~at ions resolutions, and 
I s r ae l has just as consistently refused to comply.- Ben-
Gurion has repeatedly declared that not one inch of 
territory occupied beyond the area assigned to the nJewish 
St a te" under the Partition Hesolution would. be surrendered, 
no t one single refugee will be allowed t o ·return, and 
Jerusa lem shall remain for ·all times the capita l of Israe1?6 
The Arabs of Palestine, on the other hand, ma i nt a in 
that their right to Palestine is ' indisputable and res t s on 
three distinct foundations: the first is the natural right 
of a people to remain in possession of the ' l and. of its 
birthright, the second is ' tha t the' Palestine Arabs have been 
in uninte rrupted occupation for over lJOO year s , and the 
t hird is that they a re still the rightful owners of the 
homes and lands in which the Israelis now live and work.27 
Henry Labouisse, former director of the u. H. Helief 
and Hork Agency for Palestine Refugees, reported to the 
,. • • J 
; ~ - '. . ' ( 
26David Ben..;Gurion, He birth 'and Destiny of Israe l, 
thilisophical L~~rary, N~w York, 19~ p. 489. 
27Uejla- Izzedin, The J\rab ~/orld., Past, Pr esent. and 
Funure, Henry llegnery Company, ~hicago, 195), p. 221. 
• • a .. 
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Genera l . ssembly as far back as 1954 that the refugees must 
be g iven the choice between repatriation and compensation as 
prescribed in Assembly Resolution of 11 December, 1948. The 
Arnb ~tatee accepted the proposal, but the Israeli 
representative rejected it outright and attacked it as an 
encroachment on the sovereignty and the integrity of his 
country.28 
In his June 15, 1959, report to the General Assembly 
recommending continuation of UNRHA until 1970, the 
Secretary General said: "No reintegration •muld be 
sutisfactory, or even possible, were it to be brought 
about by forcing people into their new positions against 
their will. It must be freely accepted, if it is to yield 
l~sting results in the form of economic and politica l 
stability.n29 
Whether justified or not, it became inevitable tha t 
the establishment of the State of Israel in the heartland 
of Arabism would monopolize most of the political 
anxieties and energies of the Arab States. Their overall, 
centra l instrument for poli tice.l action \'IBS the Arab 
Le ague. Though the League had come into existence already 
before 1947, it was soon to find itself dealing more with 
the problem of Israel than it did with- any other single problem. 
28rb , 
---1.!!· • p. ~2J. 
I 
29s . Hadawi, \.QR. ill·, p . 5. 
! 
\ 
CHAPTER II 
THE AHAB LEAGUE 
,. 
' . 
I ~ : ) ,.• 
~. . .. i "! •• ~.' .. 
. 
~' ... 
. . 
CHAPTER I I 
.. , 
r 
'. 
THE ARAB LEAGUE 
On December ,25, 1944,. ~fter nearly two years of 
consultations, an Arab .conference, presided over by Nus t afa 
Al Na ha ss Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, and attended by 
delegates from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria 
and the Yemen, met in Alexandria and formulated what has 
come to be known as the n Alexandria Protocol, 11 which 
delineated the outlines of an Arab League. Six months 
later, on the 22nd of I"larch, 194.5, the pact of the Arab · 
League, based on the Alexandria Protocol was -signed at 
Ca iro, Egypt.30 , .. 
'rhe Pact, which became •the ·constitution of the .Arab 
League, contained twenty articles and three annexes. '1'he 
main purpose of the League, as embodied in the pact, i s 
a s follows: . ' . 
' 
To co-ordinate the domestic and foreign 
policies of member states, to s ettle t he ir 
internal disputes without ,• recourse to 
• •• 
.. . 
.... . ;. 
I' 
.. 
JOJameel .Shukai ry and ·B. Ghazal, National and 
I n t ernat iona l Ai ms, of the Ar ab League, Damascus , Syria , 
19.5.5. p. 27. 
; .. } :. 
force,• an~ to cubm1t ' inter~Arab disputes to 
the League ~ounc11, whose decision would be 
•executory and obligatory.' 
To protect ·and safeguard 'the integrity and 
the independence of the member sta tes. 
. r.' . • . . 
To insure that, within the frame~1ork or 
the regime and the conditions prevniling in 
eao,h. sta te, close cooperation bet rieen member 
states should exiot 1n' econom1c and finnncia l 
affairs, and ih matte rs connected witll 
nationality, passports, visas and extradition, 
socia l matters.\ advancen~e~t of e duca tion ~om<l 
public health.~l · · 
24 
Membership in the League, according to Art1&le I, is 
open to any independent Arab state. This condition pro-
eludes from membership all non-i\r ab countries, although tf:1ey 
may happen to be of tr~ s ame geogr aphica l area , the s ame 
culture and the same religion. · The ten Arnb sta tes which 
are independent end 11ow make up the ·League are the United 
J\r ab Repubiic, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Libya, 
Lebnnon, Sudan, :funis and' Morocco . · : · ~ · 
The />.r eb Lengue as a •reg ional orgnniza tion" fits 
very well within the provisions of ~Art1cle 52 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. f>' irst, its objectives go 
beyond the domain of merely mainta ining peace and security, 
because it aims at closer Wt1ty ·among the members. In · 
1945, when' the seven stntes signed :the covenant of the 
Le r.gue, they •hound themselves , under ~"\ rticle 19 of the 
pEtct, to pool their individua l e ffort s t owards the achie ve -
J 1Ib1d •• pp. )6-)7. 
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ment of goals common ~o them in their ~eglon, and to the 
United Hations . .... ·-· 
As a regional organization ,within the framework of 
the United Nations., the Arab Lefigue can contribute to the 
pacific settlemel}.t o:( .. disputes , @d~r Article 6 of its pact, 
which is in line with Az:-tic.le , 51 of th.e ~barter. Further-
more, to emphasize its chara9ter, as a regional organization, 
the council of the Arab League, ~der Article J . of the pact 
decreed that it shall . decide upon the means of cooperation 
• t ... 
with ~xisting international bodies ~d any that may be 
created in th~ fu~ure. 
• ' I I t , •• 
The first political problem faced. by the League was 
the crisis that came to its cl:_imax in 1945 between Syria 
and Lebanan, on the one h~d, and !i'rance, on theother. 
In reaction to this crisis all the League member states 
were brought to !:1 ~ified s~and, considering t t1e crisis 
as a c9mmon issue, and working toward a solution within 
the frame~ork, guidance and direction of their regional 
organization.J2 : ' . 
The same situation also-. prevailed in 1948, with 
respect to Palestine; but th~ League was unsuccessful in 
this case ~hiefly because 9f political pressures and 
conspiracies, and differences among the then governing Arab 
J2 IbJ.' d 170 
-·· p. • 
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regimes themselves.· -.Tile .. military failure of the' Arab armies 
in Palestine was only a ~onsequence , of those pressures, 
conspiracies anddifferences, ,and of the deep-rooted cor-
ruption in the Arab governmenta,s as was to be revealed in 
later years by the succeeding ones. 
Although all the. members ·stood united in the Pales-
tinean case they nevertheless failed; and their f.ailure 
taught them that only by maintaining· and strengthening 
their unified stand, would they eventually achieve victory 
against the initial Zionist success. · 
The civil war which started in January, 1948 in the 
state of Yemen at the death of its monarch, !man Yahya, 
offers a good instance of the role· which can be played by 
the League. The Arab League acted immediately by sending 
an investigating committee and by recognizing the new 
ruler. By so doing, the League ·brought to that area 
peace and order. 
In 1950; the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
on the basis ·of the precedent already established in the 
case of the ~G>rganization of American States in 1948, invited 
the first Secretary-General of ' the Arab League to attend 
its meeting as an observer.JJ ·' . \. 
t • ' ., 
JJibid '1. • I 60 • <·•.• , ' 
_., p. • 
2'1 
The oor.1bers of the League took steps to further their 
coo pert! tion by signing the colle ctive security pact of 
the l1id.dle East~ in· conformity with the principles und. objec-
tives of the pact of·· the Arab Lefl6Ue and the charter of the 
United Nations. 
L'he Arab Lea&"'Ue did not limit itself to pol1t ?.cul 
nctivity only. In fact, some of its most . const.ructive work 
wns done in the legal, socinl, cultural, and economic 
fields. 'l'hus , the League prepared the code for inter-Arab 
private international law; and, in Octobez·, 1949, it 
concluded an agreement on the nationality of citizens of 
Arnb states rsu1d1ng abroad. 
In 1952, three more legal agreements were approved. 
by the League: one related to the 11 :Jervine; of Swnrnons and. 
.Power of Attorney," another• relating to the "Execution of 
Judgement," nud one on 11 Extro<lit1on Agreement , " .Providing 
for close collnbor~tion with rega rd to the surrender of 
criminals. ~-;evet .. a l other agreements were drafted nn<.l 
a pproved by the Arab League. 
However, it is to be noted that the procedure adopted 
for concluding agreements is very slow, because a draft 
agr0ement adopted by the council and signed by the delega tes 
must also be ratified by the parliaments of euch country 
before go ins into effect. 
28 
In the social field, the Arab League organized, in 
collaboration with the United <Natfons, four seminars, lihich 
were attended by experts and delegates from the Arab states 
and foreign countries •. · The first seminar held in Beirut 
from August 15 to .September 1, 1949, made a general and 
preliminary study of. social welfare in the Arab states; 
the second seminar held in Cairo from November 22 to 
December 14, 1950,dealt with rural sociology; the third 
one held at Damascus, from December 8 to December 20, 1952, 
dealt with social assistance; and the fourth one held at 
Bctghdad, from March 6r to March 21, 1954, dealt with social 
welfare in agricultural development and industrialization 
of the Arab S tates~J4 
'I'he Arab Lea0ue established model \'lelfare centers in 
lraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen, and held a social workshop 
in Ga iro for two months (September and October, 1956). 
rwenty-six Arab .Health Conferences have been held by the 
League, and a permanent Health Bureau was established in 
the Secretaria~ besides the Anti-Narcotics Bureau, which 
investigates the cultivation, smuggling and trading of 
narcotics. The League concluded, on r1ay 28, 1959, an 
agreement with the International Labor Organizati'on ( ILO) 
to promote social and- labor stand.ards•·in' the Ar ab states .35 
. ' 
J4 I ~ •• p. 81. ~ .. .. 1 • t 
35 Arab League· Bullet·in, Cairo, Juner;. 1959. \ • I 
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" 
One of the League.' s major co:1cerns .was in. the cultural 
field. On November 27,r 1945, a cultural - ~greement wa~ 
signed which · def:ined the · goalp and principles of inter-
Arab cultural cooperation. , ,~ .. 
'rhe two chief aims of . the Le?~'Ue in this field were 
the standardization· of, various, educa:-t ional systems and the 
enrichment of 1rab culture. Agreements designed to insure 
the realization of this first objeqtive included inter-Arab 
exchange of tea chers, professors,. ,and scholars; standard-
ization of scientific terms; information concerning the 
social, cultural, economic, and polit-ical conditions . in all 
Arab countries- by means of broadcasts, the cinema, and the 
press, 
The means to enrich Arab culture were: the trans-
l ation of foreign works, the encouragement of intellectual 
pursuits in the Arab countries by granting prizes, opening 
institutes for scientific and lite~ary research, 
promulgating legislation for the protection of authors• 
rights in member states of the Le.ague; qrganizing visits 
by Arab scholars, and encourag ing cultural, scie11tific and 
educational conferences. 
The Arab League e~tablishe~ an .Institute .for the 
Hicrofilming of Arabic f1anuscripes throughout the world 
and an lnst~~ute of Higher Arabic Studies; it held several 
i~rab cultural, scientific, archaeological and linguistic 
conferences, and sports tournaments; established a museum 
JO 
for Arab culture, and~ continues to cooperate with inter- . 
national cultur·al organizat:Lons, such as UN1::$CO and others .J6 
In the economic field, . the Arab League made a great 
effort. Many projects have · been studied but not all of 
them have reached the stage of practical application. 
In accordance with 11rticles 7 and 8 of the Joint 
Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty (1950), the League 
established an Economic Council 11·to ~ brin~ about security 
and prosperity in the Arab countries." In general, the 
council was to organize and coordinate economic activities 
anu to formulate . agreements necessary for raising the 
standard of living among member states. Accordingly, the 
bconomic Council concluded in 1953 the following two 
conventions: 
1. Convention for facilitating trade exchange 
and regulating transit trade between • . 
states Jof the Arab League. 1 : 
2. Convention for the settlement of payment 
of cnrr~nt . transactions and the transfer 
of capit~l between st~tes · of the ~rab League.J7 
. ' .. 
J6Jameel Shukairy , and B. Ghazal, QQ. cit., p. 276. 
J7ill!! •• p. 275. 
Jl 
One of the most vital achievements of the Economic 
Council was the establishment of the Arab Financial Institu-
tion on June J, 1957. ~he Institution officially came into 
being on January 12, 1959, when tota l subscriptions exceeded 
75 per cent of the $57,400,000 called for in the original 
charter of the institution. 
The aim of the Institution (popularly known a s the 
Arab Development Bank) is to encourage economic development 
through private and public projects in Arab states·. Its 
participation in these projects can either be throu~h the 
extension of loans or by preparing blue-prints for such 
projects. It is also empowered to solicit foreign invest-
ment for such projects.J8 
In addition to the Arab Development Bank, the Economic 
Council founded a l~ederation of Commercial, lndustrial and 
ngricultural chambers, an _:~rab Tourist As"sociation, an 
Arab Maritime Company, a Postal Union, and a stamp museum 
at the League Secretariat in Cairo. The 6ouncil has also 
approved establishment ·or an Arab Broadcasting Union, an 
Arab ;.viation Company, established an Arab .Potash Company 
to promote production of potash in Jordan, an organized 
general .\rab Petroleum Congress and exhibition, which is 
to be convened shortly in Cairo. 
J8Arab League Bulletin, Cairo, Egypt, February, 1959. 
J2 
Last and not leaat, the Arab ~ague has been waging 
a partially sw.:ceusful boycott agninst Israel. 'r his boycott 
is the topic of the present S.tud.y. In o rder to do so, the 
League h C!S founded a special Boycott Off ice \·oli Ul its hee d-
qu~rters in Damascus, 5yri~, end local office~ in the 
va.rious r;·rc i:~ber statas. 
The 1-'lOt'k o1' the .\rab Lcnt;ue , has ouffereu some f a ilure 
and dionppoiutrocnts in the poli-cical renlm, but on tho other 
hand , it should be crcctited for the nchievernoncs accomplished 
throut;h i.ts nonpolitical activities . 
'l'he :\rt.~b League • us it stends no\-#, works to promote 
a nd. fulfill the principles set forth in its Fact. It. has 
tried to help its members to achievo full indevendel'lce and 
to check interference by tho i.•reat Powers in an area of 
strategic importance und oil wenlth. 
?he /-.rab League has given 'its members a mot•e prominent 
place in world affairs, but many internal problems hllve 
cuased occasional embarrassment. Its future will depend 
fina lly on the strength of the principles wh1chhol't it 
together. 
CHAP'.I."ER III 
THE ARAB BO¥CO'.rT 
.· 
'• ·.~ ... r ' . . v : ~ ~: .~ 
,... ,t' .t~ icnt .. 1 ...... , •" .. t.f ""'""j : .... , ~ ~~ 
. 
. 
THE ARAB 'BOYCOTT 
--· . 
I o. 
.. 
I . • 
•' ! • I II 
The Arab .States urge~ 'lfheir , boy~ott of Israel ~~ a . 'lli• r: 
defensive measure against the establishment , of that state. 
' • • 4 • 
It represents a protest . ~g~inst ~!!~ fact t~at, Isra~l.,. has 
pers~stently :t .. efused to l~ye , up , ~~ th~ UniJ;ed Nations_ 
Resolution of 1947 , , under wh1ch1 it ~arne into being, _, and 
continues to occupy 40 per cent. m~re territory t~an w~s ~ 
granted it by the United· Nations. 
• ' I • -
. ,. . " ~ , . 
Israel prevents the retur~ .of the ~illion A~~b~J ~~ 
refugees who had ~been expell~g. , fr;om their hqmes. . Interna~ ., 
tionalization qf Jerusalem,. de.cid~d upoJ! by the United 
Nations, continues to subject the Arabs who remained in 
Israel to discrimination and 'Pet:~~cu~iq_~. , ... ·.Hor~ov~r,. a• ~ -~: •. r 
Israel harbors es~sionist designs, ·and has made military 
.. ., .. . .. 
•"" .. - . l 
In the past, relations between Arabs and Jews in 
Palestine were not friendly. A~te;r . 18,6Q, the Arabs :'~"··, 
welcomed the ~m~_igra;tes who .. ~~~~.veci , ~~'fr~f,u~y~s r~~~~~-
Russian persecution or who ca me from religious reasons. 
Despite the fact t~~~ the ,Jew~ ~~r~ .estab~~shcd in their 
.!. r.· 
35 
own ::.ettlements, the· Arabs did nothing to prevent them from 
. (' 
ac~ · . .nring new l and for further settlements, and they helped 
them in many other ways.39 
The Arab at~ti tude t'oward the Jews did not alter even 
when the newly established Zionist organs sent to Palestine 
the so-called "Second Alliyah"--a far greater wave of 
• I 
i mmigrants reached Palestine. But while· the fi r abs continued 
to welcome their Jewi sh guests, the Zionist l eaders in the 
new settlements soon initiated the practice of "boycot ting " 
their Ar ab hosts. The f irst step was to expel the Ar abs 
who had been ruid were being hired by each settlement to 
watch over its property and guard its a ssets. In a paper 
wri t ten in 1917 under the heading, ~on Judea and Galilee," 
and recently published in his bo~ Rebirth andDestiny of 
Is r ae 1, 1'1r. Ben-Gurion describes how he and his a ssociates 
agitated \'lithin their settlements to expel the Arab 
wat chmen. 
" \<le wished to vindi cate our nationa l honor, the honor 
of our work of revival," he writes.40 
Having preva iled on their fellow- settlers to expel 
.. - .: .. 
39General Union of t he Arab Chambers of Commerce, 
I ndustry, and Agriculture, The Ar ab Boycott of Israel: Its 
Gr ounds and Its Regulations, Beirut, Lebanon, 1959 -
40David Ben-Gurion, QQ. £11., p. 15. 
)6 
Arub "Hatch and \-Jard," as the first 1-'r-ime i1inister of Israel 
.. ,'t:;~ 
later confessed, the leaders .of the first decade Zionist 
lt .... ' 
settlement in Palestine soon -moved on to consolidate their 
gc;. ins. Their next objective \'lOS to ·bar J.rab workers and 
farmers from working on · Jewish settlements. This policy 
was later adopted officially by Zi'onist congresses, and laid 
down as one of the basic principles of Zionism. It was a 
condition which the Jewish agency, in order to secure the 
cooperation of Zionists came to accept as one of the 
i nviolable principles.41 . 
Dy virtue of this principle, innumerable Ar abs who 
were dispossessed of their, lands were also being denied the 
means of livelihood on those l&nds. It was to be expected 
that the swelling of the ranl~s of such displaced Arabs would 
eventually prove~ explosive. Yet Zionist historians speak 
of this practice ·as one of ··the most farsighted mea sures 
introduced by the early Zionists and one of the most signi-
ficant features which differei!tiated the Zionist settle-
ments of the 1900's from the · Pre-Zionis t settlements of the 
1880's. Thus I1r. Israel Cohen, one-time General Secretary 
of the Central Office of the World .Zionist Organization, 
writes: 
A radical change was brought about by the 
.6 ionist organization and the Jewish National 
41Israel Cohen, ! Short History Q£ Zionism, p. 125. 
Fund, for. the .. Jews \'#hom they settled on the 
soil wera primarily activated by the desire 
that the land should: remain permtmently: in' 
Jewish possess ion, and they considered it 
esst:~ntial to this end .. tha t it snould a lwa ys 
ba cultivated by J ewish labour. 2 . 
.. 
J 
!:.ipe akin5 of the earlier .Pre-Zionist settlemeut, he 
s ay3 : " 'l:he most serious blemis h, from t he J eHi s h po i n t of 
v i ew, \'laS that the hired l a bour consisted entirely of 
Arabs."4) Aga in, oontrastilliS the two types of i mmi gr a tion 
a nd settlement, he S6ys: 
Prom the year 190.5 there wa s a new wave of 
JeJ'Ii oh i mmi grat ion into .Pales t ine , the 
Second Waye ••• they were animated by 
socialist ideas, they wished to see J ewish 
iu.t!JC1S, and they were looked at · AsKance by 
t he older genera tion of colonists, who 
ectployed ;\rab labour. • • n44 
37 
' .. : 
'lbus, as the a bove quota tions indicate, t he pri nciple 
of boycott of one community by the othe r ~'la s first i ntro-
duced, not by t he Ar abs, but by the Zionists. 
~ EXPAN:iiONI ST DESI GNS OF l SMEL 
'.i'he ,\rab attitude toward Israel is grea tly influenced 
by the fea r of further Israeli expansion. I srael is on 
record a s harboring designs for furthe r territorial 
J ~ ' 
. .. :' ... .. .. 
42Ibitl., p. 116. 
' c J. 
4Jibid.' p. 38. 
44I bid 
-·· 
pp. 6)-65. 
J8 
expansion. ro Israelis of allwalks of life, Is~ael is no t 
. l' 1 I 
an end in itself, nor .. is ··rt; •·the complete embodiment of the 
Zionist vision. 'Agafn rA'nd"aE;ain ·Zionist' and Israeli leaders 
have said that Israel i's mere'ly a phase in self -realization 
of the Zionist Hovement--a statioil' along the road, not a 
te rminus. 'rhe ult'imJ te z:.ton ist vis~on i s of a state in the 
entire a r•ea known · in Zio'nist terminology as "Eretz Israel." 
l.' t1iS a rea I covering ·t he whole or:·'mandatory Pa les tine and 
f ormer 'l'rans-Jordan ; is 'eight times a~ ·l a rge as tha t 
a ssigned to the "JeNish" 's tate by the lJni ted ~~at ions in 
its l'a.rtitiort' Re solutHm:• o'f 1947. ... .... 
l'he re a re toda y in the Parliament of I s r ael, )8 
I . >.,lJ I 
meiJl.-ers out of a total · mcrnoership o'f' ' 120 who are committed 
to the principle ·tha t th~ r emainuer of :s o-ca lled II I~re tz 
. . 
. ~ .. , 
I srael " sho.ll be' brough t under the control of the state. 
J 
::hen '.'le recal'l that parliamentary electio~Js in Israel a re 
conducted on the basis of "proportionpl r e presentation,"45 
. . . 
we re c.1lize that ·close to one-third of the. vot ing popula tion 
of Israel ha s thus expresse~ itself in the 1955 e l e ction as 
being in favor of a n "a ctivistn program of expansion. 
1.ccording to its officia l platform, the Herut Party "Calls 
for the territorial integrity o~ Eretz Israe l (Land of 
Is r ael) in its historic boundaries · on~ both sides of the 
45s t a te of Israel, Facts a11d Figures, 1955, p . 17 . 
J ordrul. • 
Ahdut Haavod.a-Paolei Zion struggles for the crehtion 
of ''a socialist state of Israel in entire ho!lleland," and 
the General Zionist Party proclaims that "'i'he ~i ta.te of 
Israel does not e~ist , for its own snke but ,as an inE?trumellt 
for the implementation of the Zionist idea~.n46 
Nor is this candid avowal of expansionist aimG confined 
to so-ceil led "ex1;remists. n Premier Ben-Gurion, wri tine; in 
the Government Year Books, asserts ~hat ~he state "ha~ been 
resurrected in the »estern part of the land of Isracl,"4? 
tmd that independence has been reached r: in a part of pur 
small country." He says: 
i;;very state consis'tn of a land and a peo,plc. 
Israel is no exception. but 1t is a state 
identical neither with its land nor with 
its people. !t has already bSen i>a.id that 
\'lhen the state \1a.s established it held 
onl1 six per cent of the Jewish people 
remaining alive after the Hazi Cataclysm. 
It must now be said tha t 1t hns baen es-
tablished in only a portion of the lund 
of Israel. Even those who are dubious :~o 
to the restoration of the historical 
frontie~s, a3 fixed and cry a tallized lmd 
given fro.m the beginning pf time, will 
hardly denl the anomaly of the boundaries of 
the state. 
J,·· 
... 
46Ibid., pp. 17-19. 
_ . 47state or lurae1, Goy;ernmen1!, Year lli29..!i, .571J 
J.ntroduction, 1952, p. 13. 
48vbid ..,.,.. =----·. p • .s..;>. 
But, apart from what its political or its national 
leaders proclaim_, the State of Israel, as a state, is 
officially on record as committed to this expansionist 
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program. In the most author~tive officia l state document 
that Israel publishes, the Govern.I!lent Yearboolt (for 
1955), the statement is made in behalf of the state it-
self that the creation of the new state by no means 
derogates from the soope of historic ~Eretz Israel.~49 
Arabs believe that the decision to expand, having 
been made by Israel, · menns that its impl~mentation is only 
a matter of time. Zionism in the past sixty years has proved 
itself to be not unprepar.ed to seek, its ultimate goals 
piece-meal. \lhile expressing apparent contentment, with a 
lesser goal, according to the concrete possibilities of 
the moment, ~ionism has always been poised for ascension from 
the temporary goal,_ at tn~ convenient moment, towards 
further objectives formerly disavowed in public. There is 
no reason to assume . that today's disavowal of expunsionist 
intentions, \ihich are .. occastonally. made by Israeli leaders , 
for interna~ional consumption, reflects more .truly the aims 
and designs of Zionism than do.· the perennial pronouncements 
of Zionis.t mas~ers, the political declarations made in· · · 
Israel by r~sponsible political leaders, .and the practical 
1l-9Ib ·d. 
_l._.' p._ 32. t. 
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indications embodied· ~n Israeli mea sures and policies--all 
of which jointly point~ in the dir ection of future expansions. 
. . . \ .. ; .. 
THE i}OALS OF 'J!HE BOYCOT'f ., 
1f he .. r ab states rea lized that· Israel, a smRll 
unviable country, could not supply the necessary food 
pronuction, raw materials for industry or natura l resources 
for her survival l'li thout the. assistance of the surrounding 
Arab countries. It wa s clear to• the Ar ab states that 
Israel, at the center of the Arab world, dreamed of being 
the industria l sea t for the Arabs, and t !1us domina te their 
economics. 'fhrough economic streng th, Israel, with its 
steady flow of immigr ants, would be in a position for 
politica l domination.50 
Could the 1l.r ab St a tes safeguard themselves against 
such dominations by political means? . The political 
support Israel found in the most influential \~estern States 
put her politically in a very f~vornble position, and the 
Arabs had to think · of other weapons than political ones. 
Only through economic pressure might they possibly prevent 
the territorial gro'ltth of Israel. In the light of this, 
the ~rab states envisaged ·the economic ·boycott of Israel 
as the only defense against Israeli economy. y i 
\ .. 
50Bul·letin of the Main Office of the Arab Boycott, 
;.~ o. 207, 59, (January 25, 1959). 
.. 
. . 
h2 
The l\rab states kne'l'! t ha t if the .. r ab foo<l supply to 
I s r ael were cut off, Israel would huve to import foodstuffs 
frcJm more distant countries; this would substantially r a ise 
the cost of living. If 1\rab raw materh1ls for industry 
were Ni thheld , along -vri th nat.. ural resources, I srae 1 would 
be forced to import these materials from non-hrob neiJ hbors, 
thus r ?. i s ing the cost of production a!ld the cost of each 
product. \Hth the higher cost of living , rvages '1ould. F.;.lso 
spirAl so tha t production costs would raise even higher, 
ma king it impossible for Israel to compete with other 
industrialized countries or even to find foreign markets 
for her over-priced products. Under the law of supply cmd 
demand , Israeli production could not be suff iciently great 
to make it economicnl under the se conditions. In the 
lon~ run, Israeli f nctories mieht be forced to close 
entirely . Thus , according to the Arab rensoning , Israel 
would f ace the possibility of economic c istress. 
'.i.'he :~rab boycott has run through to sta ges . The 
firs t , with limited goP. l s and means started during the 
days of the British I1andate , and was directed toward the 
Jews of Palestine . It began in 1945, but was met with 
little success. The second stage of the boycott WRS directed 
a gains t Israel. It began officia lly in 1951 and still 
continues. i\ctually, it was only a continuation of the 
first boycott. 
.. 
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'l'he first- ata,ge of the boyoopt began in December, 
1945, during the ,Bri.tish Mandate sor Palestine. During that 
stage, the objective, w~s to preven~: the : Z.io!list industri-
alization or Palestine and, subsequently,. the establishment 
of a Zionist state. 
• I 1."- : • I · 
'I'he Council of :he , Le_ague of i~rab ~tatf:!S, in its 
meeting of December 1, 1945, found that •so long as the aims 
of the Zion1~t industrial, oofll!nerci~l ~:lnd. other eco11omic 
activities were mally political, m1~ ~o long as the s uccess 
of these aims depended on the exploi t.ation of ;\rab markets. 
the ,\rab a tates had to defend PaleGtiue and resort of 
' ' 
effective means to keep it Arab. 11 .51 
·rhe Arab Lctig-ue Co~cil adopt~d.· the following 
guiding principles: , 
\,. . "'" -' "" 
' .. \.. \. .. . : •. .., ~ ,J .. 
1. All commodities and manufactured products 
·-,?f1 ~·l:!~eatine ~ewish . o~igi~ are lpl.desirab+e ... 
~ t -1" t ,. : • # . .. 
· 1).'. t~~\ 1,\r~b cow1;tr~e's. 1 ' Importing~ such 
.J o o (. I o J• t 
go,ods would. further the realization of the 
.... \ . 
51Jameel Shukai~ Y and il. Gazal, 22· gil •• p. 141. 
political objeotives .of Zionism. ~ntil 
these politics~ oojectives .are ~hanged, 
the Couhcil· of' the League of Arab States 
decided that each state must tak~ neces-
sary measures~, appropriate ·to that state, 
in accordance with the laws and 
administrative procedures of the country 
concerned. For example, it envisaged 
the use of import licenses in order to 
prevent the importation--either directly 
or indirectly--of goods from Palestine. 
In addition, the. use of any possible means 
to resist the Zionist industrialization 
of Palestine wa s considered desirable. 
Whatever measures taken should be ef-
fective prior to January 1, 1946.52 
2. The Arab League Council invited the Arab 
peoples not represented in the League to 
cooperate with the states of the League in 
the execution of this resolution and to 
_ .. t .., .. : .. , 
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52collection of the Resolutions of the Council of the 
L~ague of Arab States from the first session (J anuary 4, 1945) 
to the 27th session (l'larch 18, 1957) Resolution Uo. 16, 
second session, 22nd meeting , (December 2, 1945), p. 8. Here-
after cited as Resolution. 
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prevent ipstitutions, organizations, merchants, 
middlemen, and all individuals, from handl-
ing, distr,ibuting·,o.r consuming .Zionist 
products ~d manufactured goods.· I. 0 • '· 
J. A committee ~pres~n~ing the states or~ the 
Arab Leag~e was .to be established to execute· 
this resolution and to study any propos~ls 
which tlould lead to the . realization of the 
" .. 
Arab obje~tiv~ of curbing the Zionist 
economic threat.5l 
' . 
1 
On January 5, 1946, the committee established by 
Article J of the above ,Hesulution, held its first ' meeting 
in Cu iro. At that .rneeting, representatives from member 
states of the Arab League reported any legislation adopted 
and measures ,taken in order to aarry out the proposed 
economic boycott of Palestinian Jews • . '!he reports clearly 
indicated that· each member state had approved and executed 
the boycott resolution adopted by the Council. 
Further, the, individual states offered encourage-
ment to Palestinian Arabs -wishing to import raw materials 
from neighbo~~ng Arab states and to export agricultura~ and 
manufactured products. .. ' · ~· 
The boycott committee, in cooperation' with the Arab 
Hi gh Committee of Palestine and the local chamber of \ I 
53!.12!!! •• p. 8. 
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commerce, established .a permanent office in Palestine to 
provide rnernbEfr st'ates wi tb information ·indicating .the origin 
{Jewish or non-~ewish)' of manufactured products. The 
structure of small business in Palestine, with Jewish crafts-
men working among Arabs and all producing nearly identical 
a rticles--made such an office .necessary in order to dif-
ferentiate between prohibited Jewish products and other 
Pa lestinian products.54 .. 
At 1ts ' th1rd session in narch, 1946, the .boycott com-
mittee reported to the Arab League the various me asures 
t a ken by individual me t.'lber states to\'Iard the implementation 
of the boycott resolution. In eddition. the committee 
suggested to the League that the boycott could be furthered 
through an increase of foreign imports which would replace 
goo ds formerly imported from. Palestinian Jews. This \·Jould 
discourage merchants from illegally importing Palestinian 
Jewish goods for which there was a strong demand in ~he 
market. rioting that the measures . t aken by ~di vidua l Arab 
states were in some cases lax, the committee suggested a 
tightening of the already· establ~shed· boycott machinery. 
In June, 1946, at the fourth session of the Council of 
the League of Arab states, local boycott comntittees were 
I < 
established in Palestine and in every member state. These 
loca l committees .•wero connected with the permanent committee 
54J ameel ShuKairy, Q£, £11., pp. 142-14). 
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.· of the League directly ~ ~··P· r. r I ' ·' ( t • • ' , ., . .. _, . 
The Council 'also tdeoided· to give so pe~ cent of any 
illegally imported merchandise .. confise'ated to the individual 
responsible ·ror '·tHe lse'!zure-!o'f ,sucn ..goods. ,. , . 
At the sRme ):fession the Council decided that restrict-
ions ag.~inst the use oft'Palestinian Jewish services--such 
<:ts banking, transport, insurance, constl"uction, and 
professions--should be established·. 'l'he positive nspect of 
the boycott, i.e., the encouragement of Arab services, wns 
empha sized • .5.5 t•d: r.: .. • 
In .rtareh, 194?, at its sixth sesriion, the Council of 
the League entrusted. the Permanent Boycott Committee with 
complete responsibility for the· implementation' of all 
boycott resolutions. This gave ·the Committee the right 
to t ake any measures necessary for the furtherance of the 
boycott • .56 .1. '} \,.. ~, ': 
The Permanent Boycott Committee', at 1 ts seventh 
session, in October, 194?, submitted to the Council of the 
Arab League," a comprehensive report on the nctivities · of the 
f, rab Boycott during the period ·between January,·· 1946, :md 
.. '-·~. 
5.5Ibid.·~ ' Re·solu"tfon No. 70, · 4th session, 6th mee·ting, 
June 6, 1946, pp. 19-20. 
.. • • ,. .. .... ..... ..., <I , ... -" • .,., ., 
56 .!.12!Q.. ~ Hesolution No. 152, Narch 24, !947; p. )5. 
" • " .. ~ W' ' l .. ~ '\. <I '• • d #I I 
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:.>e p tember, 1947. 'l'he report concluded with the follo\'1ing 
recommendations aime~ ·at tightening the ~oycott and. facili-
tating trade between the ~reb countries: 
1. li'urther legislation, including prohibition 
of export of raw. materials ·to l .. alestinian Jews, 
should be adopted by the individual member 
states. . .: ·. c ·., 
2. Inter-Arab .trade should_ be1 encouraged through 
the states, during the interim period 
preceding tha; ,adoption by the .Arab League 
mem~rs · or ·new passport and nationality 
regulations faclliteting tr~vel. 
J. Any trade restrictions held over from war 
time must be eased, in order to increase trade 
between membcrs . of . the Arab League. 
4. The Permanent ·.Boycott Committee noted tha t 
as a result of the boycott, the Jewish 
manufacturers in Palestine were forced to 
reduce costs, in order to underprice products, 
and thus encourage Arab smuggling of 
.Palestine Jewish products. Consequently, ,the 
committee recommended tha'b .'\rab manufa cturers 
be encouraged to reduce costs through 
utilisation of modern methods of produotion, 
in- order to compete ·favorably with the -~iQnist 
market and .. the.rebyt ~move, from the mer.chants, 
the temptntJ on ~ t..o smu;:~gle. ,. 1 ~ • • I .. '!. ..... 
5. In case_,s Hj1~~~ _Z~pnis,t 1ndustl•y iu Paleotine 
closed a~~ a res,ult of the ~ycott, ·Arab 'J 
ca. pi tal a_ho~~d ~,be emP.lO,Yed ~to re-os'tnl?liah , .. 
the induutr.y :.¥der A.t:#b ~ltfnOrsh1p ~nd manage-
ment. 
• • • "' • • : j. ~ . . .
6. ?iot1ng -tha t .capltal was being tra.nsfc:rtred 
from indu~tries Laffected ~Y the boyc~tt to 
the trausporti!tion industry, thus re-
employing those Jews who'} had lQst jobs es a 
res:..tl t of the boyoo t t , and _ena_bling the .1 .. 
Zionists _~ fac1lita te _smuggl1nB through 
the ir contr.ol of. : tranaportat ion, the Gom-
mi ttee recommeitde~ . that ,the Ar ab 1eat!l-ue 
resolution of December, 1945 be runended to 
I 
inc l ude the boycott of Zionist-operated 
transportation ~n - Pales~ine. 
'?. Not ing that some .i\.ral> manufB-oturers . reta i ned 
Je\'liGh ,a_gents in Pa~est1ne, the Committee 
recomGiendod that the me:nber s t a tes of - the 
League t al<e .a ction to abolish this practice. 
8. Notil_lg ~ the astnpli~hment : of. the loca l , . , 
boycott ~ommittee by the resolution a~opted 
by the Council, at its f~ur~h apeciul s~ssion, 
the P~rma~ent Boycott ~ ~C?~ ~ltttee . recommende4 
the.t the ·Council sugges t the following 111e~ho<ls 
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to the member 'states in order to standardize 
the boycott 'machinery; · ' 1 ' .. • ,, 
a. Local committees should supervise the 
implementa tion of all boycott resolutions 
adopted by the Council of the i\rab League 
I r •'\' _, • 
and any locally adopted decisions or 
measures · concerning the boycott. 
b. The local·· committees should remain in 
constant contact ti1th'i the Permanent 
Boycott' Committee,' ih Cairo·, in order 
to insure cooperation· and· the effective 
working of t he boycott machinery. 
c. 11he loca l · committee should ma intain 
-51 
• • ' t • 
similar contact with the concerned branches 
of local government, in order to judge the 
practical'~' results ·of'. the boycott as 
. 
locally implemented ~ 
d. The local committee should inform the 
e. 
\ . 
public of the boycott and its meaning 
through constant contabt with loca l · 
groups and organizations. 
The loca l commit tee should \mrk 'through 
the concerned branch~s of gover1~ent 
in order to f acilitate the export of 
agricultural products, ra.\'T materials and 
; ,._, f t,; 
manufactured goods to Palestinian nrabs. 
f. The local . ~?mmittee should examine all 
import;.ex~ort . lic~nses for . Palestine on 
the basis of information furnished by 
. ' . 
the permanent boycott office in 
Palestine and tht; . insturctions given 
by the poncerned branches of local 
government in order to overcome any 
illegal trade. 
. . 
•l, 
•: 
g. The local committee should be informed 
by concern~d branches of local government 
(polfce, customs, etc.) of any breaches 
of the boycott. 
h. All data and statistics should be 
analyzed by the local committees in 
order to determine the effect of the 
' . boycott on Zionist production. 
i. The local committees should organize 
boycott propaganda in cooperat ion with 
variouslocal media of information. 
j. The loca l comm·i ttees sho.uld submit to 
the permanent boycott co~mittee, in 
Cairo, a monthly progress report. 
.52 
The Council of the i rab League approved the recommend-
ations of the permanent boycott committee.57 
. ' 
57~., Resolution No. 190, 7th session, 6th meeting, 
(October 1.5, 1947), p. 44. 
ln spite of thc ' efforts of the permanent boycott 
commit tee, the boycott did' ·not fully accomplish its· ... 
objectives at this' stage for · the follo >·Iing reasons: 
.5J 
1. . .. lthough the Council of ·the _:\rab League recom-
mended the establishment· of local committees 
in each member state, not all such committees 
were established. · Hhere the' responsibility of 
implementing the boycott resolution was left 
to the various branches of .government, without 
the supervision of a local· com~ittee, the boy-
cott machinery wus completely ineffective. 
: 
In some cases, economic considera tions took 
"" ' . l .· j • • ' \ 
precedence over political ones, Other con-
siderations, such as the Jshortage of trained 
civil servants and budgetary limitations, 
prevented the establishment of loca l committees. 
2. In addition to the ineffectiveness of the 
local committees, the permanent committee was 
hampered by its own inefficiency in the early 
stage and by the inherent difficulties of 
maintaining an effective boycott. Thus, for 
I . 
..; . . ~ 
example·, a number of indus t ries in Palestine 
were foreign owned, yet mnnaged and operE~. ted 
by Jewish l abor. The permanent committee did 
not exteud the boycott to include these non-
Jewish owned factories. 
Furthermore. the permanent committee did not 
foresee the possibility of Jewish manufactur-
ers• exporting products to Ar ab countries 
through such neighbors as Cyprus, Turkey and 
54 
Greece a~d importing Arab raw materials through 
the same channels . 
J. Since the trade between Palestine and the 
other Arab couhtries excluded only Palestinian 
Jews while encouraging trade with Arabs in 
Palestine, it was impossible, at this stage, 
to make certain that raw materials, destined 
for Ar abs in Palestine, did not, in some 
cases, reach the Jewish industries. 
The opposition of the British authorities 
to the boycott further hindered its 
effectiveness.58 
58League of Arab States - Secretariat General, Minutes 
of ~ Meeting of the Seventh Regular Session of the 
Council of the League of the Arab States , (October 7, 1947-
February 22 , 1948). 
.. 
CHAPTlm V 
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CHJ\PTEfl V 
THE aoYCO'.rT ·op ISRAEL , .. ... 
Due to the crisis of May 15, 1948, which r esulted in 
the creation of the stute of I s rael, the permanent boycott 
committee, in Cairo, stopped its activities. The Arab 
states feltj however, that the continua tion of the boycot 
would be one of the most effective tools agc inst the newly-
crea ted state of Israel. • ·consequently, 1'n 1 ts 11-~oth session 
of May 19, 1951, tho Gouncil of the Ar ab r~ague; acting on 
the recommend."ltion of the Political Oommittee of tht~ -Loue,ue 
(August 19.50), ndopted a resolution establishing regional 
offices in each of the mernber states ~under the supervision 
of a main office in Damascus·; $yria. 
1his office was directed by a commissioner general, 
appointed by the· Secretary General of the League, assisted 
by liaison officers from every Arab country. - The -latter 
were appointed by the r espective home ~overnrnents. 
'lbe objective of this ne\.of syste L'l \iUS·· to organize dif-
ferent ways nnd means of putting the boycott into effect. 
·rhe text of tho resolution lfas a s follows: .• 
1. Noting the resolution of the Political 
Committee. of llugust, 19.50, end the 
necessity for its hasty imp,lementation, 
machinery must be established for ~he 
organization and planning o~ meas~:res ,1whioh 
will reG.lize the boycott of Israel. 
This machinery should consist of a comrais-
' 
sioner appointed by the Secretary General of 
' . 
the Arab League • 
·The Commissioner Nould be assisted by repre-
sentatives appointed from each of the 
member states. The commissioner should be 
appointed within one month, his assistants, 
within two months, and the whole machinery 
should be in operation within three months. 
2. The commissioner sh~uld establi~h a main 
office in Damascus, Syria1 The function of 
the main off~.ce would be ... the coordination 
). 
of the aqtivit~es of the regional offices 
toward the realization of the boycott. The 
Ia<;J:in office would assure the conti~uation of 
the · b~ycott on th~ regional l~~el. 
The Commissioner should . invite the liaison 
•' ,J .. • 
officers (who would otherwise head the 
. \. . 
regional .. offices) to Uleet with him at any 
·~ 
desi~ated place, when he deems such ~ .c 
conference necessary. 
57 
4. ~ach member nhould establish a · separate 
office {reg ional) to be ade quately staf fed 
a..'td. equipped ih order to perform its function 
satisfactorily. · . 
· ' 
.5. 'fhe regional off ices will ' bc · in constant 
conta ct with the commissioner and the ma in 
office in orde r to r e ceive informatio~ nnd 
instructions from the Commissioner, who will 
supervise ·these offices·. . · :, 1• 
6. The Council of the Arab Ltwgue recommends 
that each member f:ltat·e provide every 1 · 
f acility to the stnff of the r egional office 
in order t o expedite 'the ' '.:TOl''k' i.1s· the Com-
missioner seeu fit. 
7. 'l'he Commi ss ioner should submi t monthly 
reports on the activities of the offices and 
their ·employees to the Secre~uriat General 
of · the Arab Len5\le which will imr:;edi a t e ly 
transmit the report:·j to the met.1ber covern-
mcnts und · the Council of the League. The 
Co"mmissioner • a t his d iscretiort, or upon .. 
request from the 'Secre taria.t, should submit 
special report .. :; on pul .. ticul a r co.Des; these 
. ,, 
sp~aial ' reports ·-should be sent by the 
Commissioner to the reg iona l offices dlrectly. 
58 
8. 'rhe Council of the League recommended that 
e u.ch member state regulate its foreign trade, 
paying attention to Israel's efforts to over-
come the boycott, by using foreign countries 
for transit of Israeli goods destined for 
Arab countries and Arab raw materia l destined 
for Israel. 
9. The Council of the Arab League recommends that 
the member should, through legislation and 
administrative procedures, take \'lhatever steps 
are necessary for the implementation of the 
resolution and prosecute whoever violates the 
adopted legislation by de<~ing with the 
Israelis. 
59 
In accordance with the above resolution, the Secretary 
General of the Arab League appointed a Commissioner, and an 
appropriate staff was selected from the ~ecretariat General 
of the League • 59 
Through the Commissioner, the machinery of the boycott 
was established, and the liaison representatives, fcorn the 
reg ional offices,met with the Commissioner for their first 
conference on November J, 1951. · This was the beginning of 
59Hesolutions, No. 357, 14th Session, 4th meeting, 
01ay 19, 1951), pp. 78-79. 
60 
the second stage of the Arab boycott.60 ,. · 
'fhe main boycott office and .the \regional off' ice, after 
a thorough study of the problem, .agreed upon two types of 
boycott: the first, the boycott of Israel, directly and 
indirectly; the second, hindering the development of Israeli 
economy. .• \. 
I' 
'_ilHE BOYC.Q11. 9F ISRAEL , DIRECTLY AND INDIHECTLY 
The principle of the boycott of Israel was based upon 
the prohibition of all commercial relations between Israel 
and the member states of the Arab League. · This applied to 
the importi~g of agricultural, manufactured or nny other 
commodity from Israe l to the Arab countries <md the export 
to Israel of r :nv ma teri?.ls and foodstuffs. 
'l'he applica tion cf the boycott took t!vO forms. The 
direct met:iod involved direct trade botwoen Israel and 
Arab countries. The second was aimed at ony indirect 
trade using a foreign country ~s en intermediary between the 
Ar ab countries and Israel. 
1. Direct l1ethod of the . Boycot.t Q£ Israel 
In order tQ realize the boycott directly, . 
the raain office rmd the lia ison boycott officers 
60t1inutes of ~ meeting of the Council of the Arab 
League~~~ 15th regular. session (October J-13, 1951r;--
submi t te{r ·r ecommendB·tions conc·erning the 
boycott tc the Counc tl of the r'- r ab League. 
Once o.pproved by' th'e~ Counc'il ,· these r e com-
IOendc;~ ioils COncerning ·the boycott to the 
1\rnb Le ague, the r e commenda tions were put 
into effect by the me mber gov ernments. 
'.(he measures emplo'ye<r· in ·the d irect boycott 
of Isrnel 1o11ere th~ following: · · :· 
a . 1\ll means or t r Ansportati on beh1een 
Ir3rael and 'the Ar a b countries \\'ere 
controlled .' ·· Ships and a irlines Nece 
pr ohibitea rr·om· stoppine at any~ .'i.r~b 
~Jort if", during a roundtr i p , they ha d 
violati on of this rule re s ulted in 
the shi p beinl p l a ced. on <1 ; erme.nent 
bl acklis t . Should such a ship ever 
atte~~t to stop at an ( Arub port, it would 
be r~fased a~miss ion .61 
b . I n orde r to prevent the trrmsf er of 
money from the . r ab countries, st~ict 
,; , .. 
cont~ols were pl a ced on a ll b nnki ng and 
61:1esolution No . 560, 18th Se ss ion, J r d meeti"'1g , 
meeting, April 9, 1953, p. 128. 
·.· 
61 
other channels of exchange. Any 
individua l attempting to. make 
illegal transfers of money wa s 
prosecuted by la\'1 1 and any concern, . 
involved in the illegal transfer of 
money, wa s closed. 
c. Lists and information regarding a ll 
known or suspected smugglers were 
provided by the boycott machine ry, 
62 
to all relevant departments of 
governments, especially to t h8t 
concerned with the issuing of import and 
export licenses. 
The ma in boycott office wa s r equired 
to prepare black-lists of a ll 
convicted smugglers, for distribution 
to all concerned departments of member 
governments. 
d. In order to prevent Israel and individ-
uals from taking advantage of the long 
borders separating Israel and the Arab 
countries and the~ seapoast, s ~rict 
border controls, both mechanica l and other, 
were intensified. . In additL)n, t l1c flow 
of goods to border a reas wa s ,regul~ted 
2. 
so as to' prevent a surplus of ma terial 
which could be profita bly smuggled 
' ' into Israel. ~ · • ~ ! • . 
L ~h~ Indirect Method of the Boycott of I srael 
Realizing tha t direct trade was not the 
only means of exchange between Israel and 
t he Arab St a tes, ' the boycott ~nchinery 
c:=illed attention to the following 
possibilitie s through which Israel might 
j I £ ( 
attempt to overcome, ·to s ome extent , t he 
direc t boyc'ot t ·of t r ade. 
a . Indirect imp6~tgtion of Arab food-
stuffs 9nd ra1"1 mate rials t o 
Unable to secure the necessa ry 
.. 
imports. from ~he Arab countries 
directly, Isra~l resorted to 
using such ~~ighboring c.ountries 
- - ' 
a s, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and 
Ita ly as inter mediary routes 
' ' . 
of trade between the Arab 
countries a~d Israel. The boycott 
machinery took the following 
preventive measures against the 
indirect importation ot: foodstuffs 
63 
.. 
and raw materials .to Is~ael. 
' • ... ' .. • • l • ... r• 
(1) 
' \ 
I •• 
All ma teria ls needed by Israel 
. I . • .. \ • • . ' 
require~ licenses, for export from 
I • 
the A~a~ countri~s. A list of 
all foodstuff s and raw materials 
• I 
in this category was prepared. 
-· • ·~ .. • f 
It was stipulated tha t before 
. . ' 
receiving a license, an exporter 
must give a gu~rantee that 
f • • •• l. . : . 
certification from the proper 
~uthority, ~otarized by the 6. . 
Arab Consulat~. and indica ting 
l. - ._ • • I 
that the goods had been 
·~ 
c~:msumed in the cou~1try to 
which it wa s consigned, would 
t ' • • 
be forthcoming • 
. ,, . ' 
'£hese 
\ \ l .. 'f" ,, 
regulations applied equally 
t., #t 
to the Arab free zone. The 
• ' I 
regional offices were requir~d 
to submit weekly reports of all 
materials exported, to the 
above mentioned countries, in 
I Yo 
order to determine whether the 
. . 
quantities received, from 
va~ious Arab sources, were 
consumed in the countries to 
64 
which they had been consigned. In 
this way a further check was possible. 
(2) The CoUncil recommended to each 
member state that economic agreement 
between an Arab state and any foreign 
state should includ a clause prohibit-
ing the re-export of Arab goods to 
Israe1.62 
{J) 'lhrough diplomatic channels, Arab 
governments should inform foreign 
countries of the importance the Arabs 
attach to the smuggling of either 
Lrab or Israeli goods, through 
foreign countries to Israel and Arab 
countries, respectively.6J 
(4) The boycott apparatus established 
special regulations of trade between 
arab countries and the neighboring 
countries such as Cyprus and Turkey 
which were suspected of re-exporting 
Arab goods to Israel. 
b. Indirect exportation of manufactured goods 
from Israel to the Arab countries. 
62Ibid 
-· 
6Jrbid. 
6.5 
66 
The boycott apparatus considered the pos-
sibility of Israel's overcoming the· boycott 
against exports from · Israel to .· the Arab 
countries by sending her, goods to a free 
zone or to a foreign country for further 
processing and re-export under a foreign 
label. To prevent this indirect exporta-
tion of Israeli ·produots to the Arab world, 
the boycott machinery took the following 
-.. . .... , 
- ~ ..1 measures: 
(1) To prevent- the - import of Isreli 
goods through foreign countries to 
the Arab states, lice11ses were 
required· for all goods, whatever· 
their origin. In addition, to the 
import licenses, · a ~ certificate of 
origin from the chamber of commerce 
or industry of~ a foreign country 
with the' notarization of the Arab 
consulate in that country• was.,• 
required. • ... J ... .. ' .. . ' . ~ 
(2) Al~ trade agreements , between Arab 
and foreign•countries must include 
a clause prohibiting the export to 
the Arab countries of goods of 
~. Israeli origin of goods which had, 
64Ibid 
-· 
· in· ·any· degree," been· produced, added 
to or' changed by· I-sraeli 'labor•·64 
(J) ·In."order ·to· ;faci\litate the boycott 
work of the concerned departments of 
Arab countries, the · machinery made 
available lists of all goods exported 
by Israel to all fore~gn countries. 
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'l'he lists 'consisted ·' of three· categories: 
The first category included all 
goods e~ported from Israel to the 
foreign countries which the l a tter 
did not itself produce in king. · The 
goods in this· ca tegory were not to 
be imported to the Arab states from 
that country. '" , 
The second categorY- included goods 
produced in a foreign country, in a 
limited quantity, thus requiring 
importation of this same· product 
.from Israel, for its own consumption. 
~·/hen suffici ent proof was provide'd 
indicating that g'oods in this 
category h~d- been produced in the 
foreign- country ; the ~rab countries 
.. 
i •. It 
could import such goods. 
I ~ 
The third ~~tegor~ included goo~s 
produced in ~he foreign country 
but not produced in Israel in an 
amot.:nt \'lhich would peru.it export. 
~h~se goods could be imported by 
/, rab countries. 
( 4) :Ul goods imported to the Ar&b 
zones would come under the same re-
striations as goods i mported to the 
Ar ab countries. 
(5) Specia l regulutions were ina~1t.uted 
concerning t.hree countries. In the 
.. 
c~se of Gyprus and l'urkey , \'lhose 
geoe rephicnl proximity to Israel and 
the .• r ab countrie~ made trede 
rela tively eusy and inexpensivE!, 
meaoureo were taken to prevent 
Israel's establishing trade bases. -
1 
Because of German revaration to 
lsraelis, spec1ul restrictions were 
placed -upon riest German imports. 
(a) Imports f.!:2m ~~vrus - Only 
products produced in ~yprus 
icselt', and not produced . by 
Israel were accepted for 
68 
import by the Arab· countries. 
Alx Oyprus-prouuceu•·imports 
1•e'quired a ' certifioate of origin 
from the chamber of commerce 
or the Union of· Commerce and 
Industry and a notarization by 
the government of Cyprus and 
the concerned Arab Corlsulate in 
Cyprus .6.5 
(b) Imports · from Turkey- Imports 
from Turkey must be accompanied 
by a certificate of origin which 
includes a clause stating that 
the product had in no way been 
changed or added to of I sraeli 
products or labor. The cer- ., 
tificates issued by the Turkish 
authorities or the chamber of • · 
commerce, required the notariza-
tion of the concerned Arab .,. 
consulate.66 
... 
65Ibid., Res. i{o. 68.5, 20th Se s sion , 8th meeting, 
J anuary 27, 1954 , pp. 160-161. 
I f, ,. . . 
' 
66nesolutions, No. 1077, 24th Session, 4th meeting, 
Novembe r 15, 1955 , p. 251 . 
. ~ 
r 1 - ··. 
(c) Imports from West Germany - ln 
order, to prevent Israel 1s sel-
ling materials. received through 
the German Repa.rn.tion program,, 
to the Arab countries, .. ( t hrough 
other countries) the folloNing 
measures were t Hken: 
{1} Unless tho, importer proved 
beyond a doubt that the 
goods of West uerman 
origin imported from other 
·countries were not repara-
tion. goods, these goods 
could not be imported to 
,... the . Arab countries. 
(2) . Importers bringing goods 
70 
r ·, from Uest Germany must present 
certificates from the proper 
West ~ German authorities and 
the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry and notarized by the 
concerned Ar ab consulate 
stating thnt the goods came 
directly from the producer in 
Germany <md were not a part of 
the Israeli reparation 
. 
' . . 
! : 
.. 'r. 
.. · goods.67 
{d) Products of Foreign Industries 
in l'lhich lsrae 1 or 1nd1 vidual J. 
Israel1s -own stock, partiully or 
entirely. Having noticed that 
both Israel end individu~l 
· ' Israelis \oJere investing abroad, 
by participating in certa in , 
foreign industries, the Ar ab 
countries took necessary 
mea sures to prevent the products 
of these industries f'rom reach-
ing the 1irab ma rket. Such 
products, having a foreign 
(non-Israeli) origin, would 
otherwise not have been 
· . : restricted. Industries · of this 
kind were e t> tablished in 'furkey, 
for example. 
'l'he .. rub staten p2sse d legisla-
' ' .. 
tion clnss iPying the following 
products in the s nrne category 
67~., !~eG. :~o. 6ne , 20th ~~es s lon, 8th m~eting, 
January 27, 19.5l~, pp. 162-16). 
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as lsrael~.,gp~~~: al:l· products prq_- !:! ... 
d~ced outsid~-<.lsrae_l, o.\!D.ed ':!Y 
Israel:_,,f lsz:ae~.is, persons living in 
Israel, organizations. in Israel, 
... ~ . .. ~ .., 
· . ·. Israeli . ag~nts {or r persons serving 
. ... . . 
·: .. , the int.e.r~st ~f Israe,l. 68 ~ t 
(e) ~ionist . Capital . ~ .\·Jhile ,encouraging 
·., .,._. 1. foreign investment in Arab economics, 
. . 
investig~yions •. 9-n l £oreign capital. 
in 9rder . to p~event Zioni~t capital 
from ope.r~~int? i.n the ~rab wo_!•ld , . 
ana thereby controllD1g Arab 
e~onom~~~ and di~ecting th~m toward 
,., Zio~~st _.go~l~ J 
.. l l ec .·Ji.: '" r· 
.. . ~ ... ~ I 
4 -- , 
HINDEHING !!.ill .DEVELOH1ENT 0~ filE I SHAELI ECOHOMY 
The boycotF of Isr~eli . trade with the Ar a b wo~6d did 
make its mark on the Israeli economy. . Hot1ever, 1 t did not 
strangle that economy, the doq~s of non-Arab countries 
being of course open to her. 
•. 
• <- - • .: - t.. 68Econom1c Council of the .~rab' League-First regular 
se ~: sion, December j_, lill-July _,22, 1954 , p. 506 • .-1~he 
unified law of Arab Boycott, Article II • 
. . 
..., ,. - L 
. . , 
• - ... " · v -" ~ ·~ · ~ --.: •• 't .. ~r · .. ~e '-".:· .. ~ u .. ..,ta1 
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Israel was developing her economy through ·l and reclam-
ation, irrigation and industrializa tion. Through her 
agricultural and industrial development, Israel was able to 
overcome to some extent the existing unemployment and to 
provide employment for the constant flm1 .,.of irmni~runts. 
Such a development progr am required· cons·iderable capital 
not ava ilable in Israel; the refore, Israel encouraged 
foreign investments. 
At the same ti1ne Israel tried ·to overcome her trRde 
difficulties by importing foodstuffs and raw materia l from 
non-Arab countries and by exporting her manufactured . 1 
products to .,.sian and •\frican markets, or any othe r under-
industrialized country. • 
The boycott apparatus decided that i ts efforts must 
be extended in order to impede Israel's trade and economic 
relations with other countries. To t his end the Ar ab 
League adopted the folloNing measures. 
l. Discouragin ·:.> t he flO"t'f o f fore1i~n capftal to 
Israel and encourag i n,.; nlready invns ted 
capita l to wi t;hdraw. 
Using the Zion i st move.1:ent t =...- i .2fluence 
-vwrld J-e.,;ry anJ. , tha t, Jev1ry L1 ~urn, to 
influence bm .1b: i n0 houses , i Hdus tries a nd 
individuals, es~.Je ci :.:..lly i n th e United Sta tes, 
Israel h~d been ~ble tc encour age substantial 
74 
foreign inv~stment. With !the assurance of 
attractive terms. ,of investment, industries 
had establish~d ,branches, ,assembly plants,. and 
distribution c~n:tcrs in _Israel._ '"' ·. 
•I I l 
2. The Arab poycott machinery took the necessary 
.. 
steps to lead cert~in ,An~~stries to drop their 
plans for iD;vcs.tment in . ~srae.l·· and some already 
establish~d industries, to liquiqate their 
Israeli operations and to \'li thQ.raw all capital 
from Israel,. Th~se , 41ea~ures taken by the boycott 
machinery poohibited t~~ import by tho Arabs of 
the following lcompan~e~ : 
a. . Firms that had branch factorie s in Israel.69 
b. Firms that had a ssembly plants in Israel, 
. . 
c • . 
··-
or firms wpose agents assembled their 
products in Israel.70 
Firms thb.t pad agencies or .main o.(fic;:es 
in Israel for their Middle Eastern 
operations.?! 
69iiesolutions, Ho. 560, 18th Se ssion, Jrd meeting, 
April 7, 195J, p. 128 . 
71Ibid., Res. No. 935, 2Jrd Se ssion, 2nd meeting, 
Jl , 1955, ~ - 226 . 
. 
. , .. 
.. . ' 
,. d. Firms that give patents, trade· marks, copy-
rights, etc., to Israeli companies.?? 
e. Firms and private or public organ izations 
that purchase shares in Israeli companies or 
factories.7J ~ . . . 
f .. Technical or consultant firms tha t offer 
their services to I srael. 7 1 ~ ·, 
'fhe Arab co)zlntries informed the foreign .. governments of 
these measures through their regula r diploma tic channels. 
The Arab boycott offices informed the specific industries 
having branches, etc., in Israel that they must choose, with= 
in a period of not more •than tnree months, to terminate their 
operations in Israel and reta in '~heir- branches in the Ar ab 
countries and the n rab mar l(et for t he ir prod .. ucts , or conti-
nue in Israel and lose the .ir ab mCirke t and di :;;continue their 
1\rab operations. 
In order to ·encourage the establishment in the ar ab 
world of foreign industries taa t left Is r ael, t he Ar ab 
72Ibid., Hes. lJo. 560, 18th Se s sion , Jrd mee ting , 
April 9, 1953, p. 128. 
7Jibid., Hes., No. :.684, 2oth Session, 8th meeting , 
January 27, 1954, p. 161. 
74Ibid. 
7.5rbid.., Hes.,. No. 692, 20th Session, 8th meeting, 
J anuary 2(, 1954, p . 16) . 
J. 
League recom~ended that Arab countries offer th~ most ~ 
favorable encouraecment to .these foreign industries. 7.6 
u. 
f he necessity, creAted by the. Arab .. boycott, of 
76 
Israel's going to othe r countries, often at some distance, 
for r a.\'1 ma tef'ia ls, foodstuffs and 111arket~: for her own 
products, led the Arab Leac.:;ue 1to recomnend thHt Arab 
countries secure needed raw materia ls from the s~me 
source Israel used ancl compete with Israeli products in 
foreign markets. 'l"he Arabs \iere able to compete favorably, 
both in imports and exportn, with the Israelis, due to low 
costs of production.77 ..; . t 
'r. 
PEJAL'l'IB~ FOR BOYCOTT VIOLA? I. OHS 
I n the be0 i rmiu g of t he boyco ~ t t he individual Arab 
st<.:..te s enacted ~he ir O\·lll l (J.WS r-t.wl r e 1.5ulrit ions concerning 
smugg line,; un ti any uthe r t ype of violat i on of the boycott. 
These l m1s varied in de~ree, but in gene r a l they were 
l enient, and i n s ome count ries did not exis t . Realizing 
t h is, the boycott m8.Ci.1ine ry recommen ded to t he Arab League 
the ne cessity of establishinb unified boycott legislation 
to be appl-ied -in e e.ch rr~ember s t <>.te. ,This leg isle,tion was 
76Ib' . ., r. " ' 7!'\1 '? Q .. h · 1 ° th t • ~ ... , .~e s . l·,o. ·..;., ,_ .., _e s s on , .} mee 1ng , 
Janua ry 27, 1954, :pp. 169-lf$0. ~ 
. 
" '? . .. '-( Ibid., Hes. rJo.' 69.3, 20th Session, January 27, 
195~ , VP • 165-166. 
, . 
drafted and adopted at the 20th mcetitl5 of the e conomic 
council ofthe ltre:.~b i.eague a nd. ap.tJroveu by it on Decer11ber 
11, 1954.'18 Each member sta te or the Lea(;Ue agreed u pon 
the leg islation. 
The unified law prohibited any de c.lings with Israel, 
includ ing the lsraeli government, institution s or groups, 
Israelis, pers ons living in Isr•ael c-.. ud. those l'mrkin0 in the 
interest of Israel--either di~:•eotly or in<.iirec t ly. In 
genera l, the l a w restricted. &11 foreign t raci..e and 
specified the comaoditie s considered Isr&eli in nature. 
The unified l a w contBine<i a penalty 0f forced l obor f or 
fl period of not less than three ye:::.r~ ar:d not ~Lore than 
ten ye t?trs Rnd. for n fine of not more than. 5,000 Egyptian 
pounds (or the equiva lent).79 In any case, the 
merohP.ndise, ns well as the involved. means or transporta-
tion, would be seized by the 80Vernment. The law a l-
lotted 20 per cent of the va lue of the merchandise 
seized to the informer whose informa tion led to the 
arrest or to the officials responsible for making the 
arrest. 
78_r.conomic Deoartment_ of tr~. League of Arab States-
Pirst ~ession of the i.::conomic Cow1cil, ~ecember .,5., 1953-
Julz 22, ~. pp . 506-508. 
'19Collection of ;the l ~e_s_olution of the Council of the 
League of the Arab ~tatiS7 p. 2 07 • 
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CHA.P't ER VI 
'!'HE BOYCOTT _IU ,OPERA'fiON 
I{ .. . 
1.' (' .H.l 
THE ORG~\NIZATION vF THE, DOYCO'f:t' APPAllA'r US 
The first commissioner of the Boycott apparatus wes 
l Genera l Haheed Sha.wky, Director of the Coast Guard and 
. . 
Cus totils Gua.rds of Egypt. General Shawky wa's chosen in the 
light of his knowledge of smuggling. and his contacts with 
,. . 
customs officials in the Arab capitals.80 
I i • • 
On June 1', 19.5i, immediately after his appointment, 
\ 
General Shawky ' set up the ma in office of the boycott 
. .. 
machinery 1n~ Damascus and toured the Arab states in order 
to encourage the establishment of the local boycott offices. 
I , \ I 
General Shawky and his staff made a study of the most 
. ~ 
effective ways of controlling the Arab borders with Israel 
I f -"'I\, • " 
and contacted the i'11nistries of Foreign Affnirs with 
. . 
requests for the following information: 
l • ' 
l. The extent and incedents of smuggling between 
, •. 
the Arab statea and Israel, in either direction. 
80neport Q!l the Activit~ of the !Jecretariat General 
.Q£ the Leagl.!e 2f. ~ St~ between~ lOtll lim.!! the 18th 
Sessions ·rrom ,Maroh 17th.~ 12 Maroh ·g&. ~. Report 
.Q!:. the 15th Sesoion. 
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2. Lists of persons, companies, .. and organizations 
involved in - smu-~gling activities to and from 
Israel. .:. l . . ... 
J. The economic situation in Isrnel and Israeli 
needs for Arab produ~s. .., 
4. The condition of Israeli industry and ·thej 
type of products which might be exported to 
the Avab tworld. ~ · 
5. Penalty in ~ each Arab codntry for individuals 
involved in smuggling between Israel and the 
Arab countr1es.81 
The relations between the main office in Damascuo and 
I ' 
the newly organized local offices were such as to ensure the 
., 
necessary cooperation for the affective implementation of' 
the boycott. 
'rhe main office of the boycott was responsible to the 
Council of the League of Arab States for the execution of 
the boycott. The main office consisted of legal experts, 
.. , 
economists, attaches, and secret informers. It worked 
in cooperation with the various departments of the Arab 
r ~ ... '. 
League especially the economic and the Public Information 
departments • 
... t . ,~ . · , . .. 
~ 
81Ibidl, Report QB ~ ac~ivity of ~ ~ office 
g.£. the boycott, dated September ll, 12.2!· . ·, :, t.u. 
. ,. 
• •'J • r.{ • \,.I ' \ • i.., I J . ' • • "tL 
80 
The main office submitted a report every six months 
to the Arab League concerning its activities and those of 
the local offices. In addition, .occasional repo~ts were 
submitted when necessary. • r 1 .... 
Every .local office had i t s own apparatus consisting 
of employees .and informers • . The local offices worked in 
cooperation with the local departments concerned such as 
customs, police, security, and •others. . .. 
'fhey also worked in cooperation with~< the economic 
a ttaches in their missionmroad~ 
\ .. I j I • 
1be Activitx of the Boycott Apparatus 
J I I • • \ I 
' 
·• 
The ~in office concentra ted on permanent re s~arch 
of the Israeli economy with emphasis on commerce and 
l.i 
indus try, agriculture, wa ter development, e tc. It also 
\'ratched closely the economic and financia l rela tionships 
between I srael and other countries. Reports were 
circula ted to local offices and departments, loca l lia i son 
officers were invited usually twice a yea r, to conferences 
for a thorough discus sion of all aspects of the boycott. 
l•1ethods employed, results, new situa tions and possibilities, 
etc., were explored. Recommendations were presented to 
the Arab League Council and/or to the Economic Council of the 
Ar ab League. · J: . '' .. . . ' 
Incidents of. viola tion of the boycott were investigat ed 
and tried by the local .authorities. All ' i~ormation on the 
81 
incidents was sent- by the local boycott offices to the 
main office for further investigation. If the main office 
found the case a valid violation, the information was sent 
to all the local o ffices ~and the . persons involved were 
placed on the black list. · .. 'l • ~ 
The activity of the boycott organization could be 
summarized as follows: · 
1. Hatching the local market and the possibilities 
of smuggling between the Arab States and 
Israel~ petty · incidents of smuggling of 
Israeli merchandise by individual Arabs took 
place here and there. 'and smugglers were 
punished through seizure of the merchandise. 
Through its agents in foreign countries the 
I • 
main office investigated the consumption of 
Arab products to determine whether such 
I 
products were re-exported to Israel. 
2. Foreign Companies - The main boycott office 
placed on a black list all companies which 
had violated the boycott regulations. No 
Arab country was permitted to dea l with 
such companies. 
. . 
. .-
Before such companies were black-listed they 
were given three months in which to comply 
with the boycott regulations. and thus avoid 
the black-list. .N.eny companies which r w~r~ 
black-listed discovered that the 1 l~s~ qf the 
Arab market was not economically justified 
by the gain of .the Israeli..marke·t ~ . ·. .. ..t _ ; · 
Consequently, tbey complied .with the boycott 
regulations, and their names we~e removed 
. ' 
from the black list.·, . , ,· 
). r,oreigp. t1aritime Companies ·- No foreign 
passengers nnd car go ships with regula r Ar ab 
- . ports of call were allowed to stop at an 
I 
Israeli port during one round trip. The 
only exception to the rule was for inter-
national tourist ships.82 
Ships carrying strategic military material 
to Israel or hired by Israel or an Israeli 
citizen were black-listed. Ships so black-
listed, having occasion to stop at an Arab 
port, would receive no water, food or other 
services. Should the necessary guarantees be 
presented to the boycott office, a black-
listed ship could be removed from the list. 
Should such a ship violate ~he boycot~ a · 
second time, it ·would be permanently black-
-------l -· l ' • ' 
82 
82Report .QQ ~ activity 2£ the main office and ~ 
local offices 2[ ~ boyco t t ~ ~ first ~ gf !221, 
p. 8 0 •, I .... 
·-~~ .. ...J' 'u ....... ., .... - • .,. •\•!! ~~--· ... ::..:._•t 
c 
\.. 
4. 
listed with no opportunity for clearance., , A 
\. ·: . 
substru1tial number of bl~ck-listed ships have 
~· • ' J. 
been removed from the list. 
Airline Companies - Foreign airline companies 
.. - ' ~ .. 
having main office, branches or agents in any 
of the Arab States that did not obey this 
regulation, would receive. neither permission 
to land nor to fly over Ar.ab terr~tories. 
It is to be noted that no violation of the 
above regulation has occurred. However, Air 
I France has been black-listed, not because of a 
violation pertaining to air flights, bu't 
because of violations against the general 
rules· for foreign companies. 'fhe violations 
, ... 
committed by Air France we're due to its 
. . . 
investments in Israel, its membership in the 
joint French-Israeli Chamber of Commerce,· and 
its hesftation in providing for Ar ab tourism 
in the ·way it provided for Israeli tourism. 
\fhen Air France made the prope'r adjust""ments 
• · I • ., I 
and followed the boyco t t regulations 1 'it \'l f.I.S 
' ' l • ! 
talien off the· blahk-list and. its' planes were 
. . .... 
1:-e rmittcd to land in and fly ov'er Arab ter-
ritories.8J 
, .· ( . J • .. 
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8JReport Q[ ~ Secretary General ~ the Council of the 
League Q( Arab States - in ~ 30th Session, October 1958, 
p. 51. 
84 
5. Motior1 picture, so~~d reco~ding and publica tions -
The boycott appnratua watched all import of 
movies, records, books, m~gazines ~.:nd ne\fiSpapers 
and black-listed the follovsi.ng categories of 
information media: 
a . Everything produced. il1 Israel or by Isr<;~elis . 
b. ~1ovies starring, directed or produced by 
Israelis or individua ls knmm to have· 
contributed in any way ·t;o t he welfa r e of 
Israel. 
c. Records presenting pro-Israel sentiments 
or fea turing Israeli artists or persons 
... 
'· 
knot.vn to have contributed to the welfare or 
Israel. 
d.. Publications which, aftei• publishing pro ... 
Israel articles or avticles of a derogatory 
natur e about Arabs, refused to publish a 
corre sponding ~rticle in the interost or 
the Arnbs. 
6. Petroleum - 'l'he Arabs prohibited the flow ofpe troleum 
originatutg in any Arab country to Israel, either 
directly or indirectly. The boycotting of this 
essential commodity caused an increased in the 
price of Israeli industial products. 
Although Iurael was abla to obta in oil from 
85 
Venezuela, Rumania, USSR, and Iran, .the expense 
of transportation over long distances raised the 
price of the oil. Even in the case of nearby 
Irnn, the closure of the Suez Canal to such 
essential shipments to Israel made it necessary 
to transport the oil by pipeline from Elath to 
the refinery in Haifa. The initial cost of the 
l ~ '(·• '" ', ,... 
pipeline through the aesert, not to mention 
the additional cost of ouch a transport 
opera tion, counter-acted any advantage obta ined 
from the purchase of Iranian oil. ( 
'.fhe existing pipeline betvfeen Arab oil field's 
directly to the Haifa refinery has not been 
' • • • f , ~ • , 
-
permitted to operate under the boycott •;, 
regulations. 
. . \ .. l I 
' . : 
The oil that Israel receives from other sources 
is not sufficient, not is the supply regular 
enough, to insure . efficient operation of the 
refinery. L 
7. Suez Canal - In order to fulfill the a ims of 
Arab boycott, Egypt prohibited the passage of 
'1. 
' Israeli vessels or of goods destined for · 
Israel through the Suez Canal. Egypt con~ 
sidering itself in a state of war with Israel, 
acted in accordance with .the provisions· of 
Article 10 of the Constantinople· Convention 
of 1888. ·, 
86 
The Constantinople Convention provided that the 
Canal must remain free and open to all shipping, 
. .... 
in time of war as well as in _time o~ peace. 
•., 
· ' 
Article 10 of this trea ty, however, gives 
' 
Egypt the right to t ake mea sures necessary to 
. :' 
its defense. 
When Israel complained to the Security Council, 
the latter adopted a resolution , on September 
1, 1951, in which it "calls upon Egypt to 
terminate the restrictions on the pa ssage of 
internationa l commercial shipping and goods 
through the Suea Canal whenever bound and to 
cease all interference with such shipping 
beyond tha t e s sential to the safety of shipping 
in the Cana l itself and to observance of 
international conventions in force.84 
It must be recalled in this connection that the 
Security Council based its resolution not on 
a lega l interpreta tion of the 1888 Convention, 
84year Book of the United Nations, 1951, p. 299. 
an interpret&tion which the Council is not 
competent to make, but in the desire of the 
Council for a ·ttpeaoeful ~settlement" between 
Egypt and . Isra~l. Now this · resolution is 
one of more than 70 resolutions adopted by 
different organs of the t United ... Nations :~ith 
respect to the · Palestine problem. This is the 
only resolution with which the Arabs have not 
complied, and the only one Israel is willing 
to accopt.85 
87 -
Horeover, Egypt claims the.t its action is 
justified in terms of the inherent right to 
self-defense, a right which cannot. be curtailed 
by invocation of the 1888 convention. Egypt 
claims that she cazmot be expected to allow 
an integral part of its territory to be used 
by a coWltry with \ihich she is a t war in 
order to reinforce the military potential·· of 
that country. 
• .. 
On July 18, 1957, Egypt declared her acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of the International Court 
as ·- · Poud Mos 'hi, ~· cit., p. 171. 
of Justice. She s&reed that uny unresolved 
differences amonc; the sit; I1<'•tor1es over the 
mee.nin$ of the Constantinople Convention of 
1888, guarantoc41g freedom oi' navigation .in 
the Canal, shall be refer•red to .the Inter-. 
national Cow•t.86 Esypt. asserted hez· willing-
!!e ss to he. ve the . rna t ter of Isr&el ship plug 
refe~red to the World Court. .. ' 
8. Boycott frO!.fagand.a - The Eoycott e1Jpnrntus, n 
rela tively small orguni~ation, face d. certuin 
' . 
I 
difficulties in the initial st&ges of its 
operations. In the first place, instead of 
-
deHling with one stote, it hu.d to l<~ork with 
I 
eight Arab States (now 10 mem~rs and two 
non-members of the ft~ab Leegue ) under dif-
ferent circumstances, both economic and 
political. 
'l'he national conaciousnos u differed from one 
Arab sta te to Hnother. 'fhorcforc, it wa~ fo~ 
the main boycott office to initiate a campaign 
th~ough various social, cultural and 
86united Nntions General Assemql):, A/ J 576/adu.,l, 
S/J817/add.l, July 2) , 19)7. 
· .. '2t ..... ·- .... \ .. ~ 
,.l ... t ~ 
... , .. -·-· 
' . - ... 
- . .. 
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politiccd org.:,nlza tiur.;. f; in the ·.re b world in 
order to educf.l t!t t l·:e people tow;.; rd ~n unde r -
ot~z:dir-e~ of the importance of the boycott. 
( Kul I·~owaten .Kh;)f eer) in Dnmt~~cus , Syria, is An 
example of such lm or£;an1z<l tion tlhich 
ellcourage<l the people to be constantly on the 
Blert for f'iny violation of' the boycott from 
any q,unrter. 
89 
The main boycott office expln1.n th~t the boycott 
was not e. matter of prejudice, but of na tional 
securi t :;· for the r. r abs. It u!;ed for 1 ts purpose 
all media. of iuformat1on-rnd1o, pre t; ~ pumphlets, 
etc., in Arabic, Pronch, and Engl1sh.87 
In order to countei' the attack of Zionists Rbrond 
who presented the boycott in terms cf anti-
Semitism, the bo.}'cott office published pamphlets 
than explained its vurious tneHsureo, us a. legal 
means of protecting Arctb national security. 'l'he 
propaganda stressed the importance of the 
neutra lity on the part of foreign firms in the 
Arab Israeli dispute; i.e., contribution to either side. 
87Hepor:~ 2!:, the !)eeretarl Genernl to the Gouncll of 
League of ftr..!:\..b. ~t1ten in its 27th Session, Moroh, 1957, 
pp. J67-J68. 
. ' 
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CHAPTER VII •• J • • 
'fHE lSilAELI REACr.riON TO 'l'HE BOYCOTT 
During the e arly ·stages of : the Boycott, Israel 
considered that measure1 ns ?.n expression of· the state of 
war existing bet~1een itself and the Arab stutes. At its 
beginning, in 1950, the boycott was ioplemented directly 
by with\Wi>Jding . foodstuffs and · r~nT materiels from -Israel, and 
to counteract the effects of the boycott, Israel , at first, 
went to foreign markets . for- her~ needs. .. •• I 
Then, however, r the' Arab Leogue implemented stricter, 
more indirect boycott measures, such as put.ting pressure 
upon foreign corupanies which - invested 1n Israel or helped 
in any way the economy 1 of', that .country. Now, the weight 
of the boycott ~1as felt in Israel by the withdrawal of 
several companies which ·,did- not wish · to lose the Arab 
' markets.88 • .I 
Instead, Israel resorted to world Jewry which was to 
exert pressures of its O\'m on companies which complied 
l ,;" t 
. , . . .. - __ ... 
88neport~ 2f. ~h~ Main Office of ~ Boycott in 
Damascus during 1951, ~' 1221 ~ ~. 
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with Arab boycott restrictions. Thus, when the British 
Overseas Air\'lays Company decided to yield to the Ar ab 
demand, and , i n 1955 liquidated.her installations in, and 
service to Israel, British ~md·.\.Jestern European Jews 
refused to patronize BOAC. The financial losses incurred 
through this counter boycott of DOAC led the comp~y to 
reconsider the situation. ·consequently, BOAC found a way 
to circumvent the boycott and counter-boycott· by using 
its affiliate, Cyprus Airways , for flights to and from 
Israel.89 . .. ~ , . 
The continued Arab pres sure on, Foreign companies and 
the l a tter•s compliance led the Zionist world congress, in 
its early 1956 meeting in ·Jerusalem, to discuss the 
seriousness of the Arab boycott. The Congress declared 
that "the economic institutions in Israel, in cooperation 
with certa in economic institutions abroad, are preparing 
a counter-boycott on the internat ional level. • • The 
purpose of the counter-boycott on ·· the international level 
is to make the Arabs .understand in practical terms that 
it is possible to fight them by the same method in order to 
force them to · back down."90 
·. 
89Haboker, Israel, August 12, 12j1, guoted in ~ 
periodical Bulletin No. 11, Cairo, Hovember 4, 12j1; p. 8, 
Palestine office, League of Arab St ates. 
90Ibid. \• . I. • • i\. 
93 
The orgBnized counter-boycott by Israel, however, did 
not materia lize irnmed i ~.te ly, and it t ook the withdre:~ml of 
the ~>hell Oil Company and the British Petroleum Corporation 
in 1957 to precipitate the forma tion of a counter-boycott. 
The . withdrawal of these two l a r ge companies in the 
summer of 195~ was in answer to Arab pr essure begun after 
the Sinai campaign in 1956. Since these companies had a lmost 
exclusive control of oil marketing and distribution in 
Israel their withdrawal \'las a . blo\'t which aroused Israeli 
public opinion and prompted the Israeli authorities to 
establish n committee for the counter-boycott. 
fhe Jewish Observer of London editorialized on this 
event on August 23, 1951: 11 A serious prestige blow such as 
the Shell and 1the British Petroleum decision to withdraw 
from Israel was needed to rouse the Israeli government to 
cons ider a move which it had been r eluctant to t ake for 
many years a c,ounter-boycott. n The committee against the 
Arab boycot~ was established under the auspices of the 
Jewish Agency. It included representatives of the 
Ministries of Fo~eign Affairs. Trade a nd Agriculture, as 
. -
well as leading personalities in private enterprises and 
cooperative industries in Israel. 
of the prodticts of- •firas Hhich help the ·Ar nbs in their 
economic warf&re~91 
The i~ea behind the· Isreeli counter-boycott was 
clearly expressed by a leading Isrr.1.eli ne\'lspaper, HEJ boker, 
which stated that : ' .. ,t • \ 
11 I:very company exposed to Arub pressure and 
which intends to terminate its relations with 
Israel must we igh the importance of the loss 
of Arab trade against the los s of not only 
Israeli trade but ulso the antagonism of 
millions of Jews throughout the world who 
wo~ld also boycott the company 's· products or · 
services." · 
'!he newspaper contineed: 
"The companies which gave in to Arab pressure 
in the past had calculated the loss of the 
Israeli market only and gave no thought to 
the possibility of a. boycott of world Jewry.n92 
In October 1959, the Renault Company mnde a public 
announcement of its cancella tion of the contract. It seems 
clear from an admission conta ined in the company statement 
and in~ subsequent developments, 'that Renault cancelled its 
contract with Kaiser-Fraser of Israel because Arab 
. ' . : . . '· 
9lacounter-Boycott Body Formed," Jewis~ Observer and 
Middle ~ Review, August 23, 19 57, p. 5 •. 
·' 
9~Haboker, Israel, August 8, 1957, quoted in periodical 
Bulletin No. 73, Cairo, November 4, 1957, p. 7, Palestine 
office, League of Ar ab States. 
• ... ·; L,. ... ~: .... '· . ·~ 
, • a ~r· J . 't ' .. ' • 
95 
nuthorities would not permit Renault to operate in Arabia 
so long as Renau~t continued to do business in Israel. The 
following is an excerpt from the aenault statement of 
October 22, 1959: 
1. 11 1 t is true a.fte.r many year.s 1 ·COntrary ,to 
the rules and practice, that certain states 
prohibited the admission of merchandise 
2. 
to proceed from firms executing industrial 
contract \'lith enterprises situated in the 
StA.te of Israel. 
Regie Renault being unable, despite 
repeated efforts, to bring an~nd to this 
situ~tion of f act, found, as have numerous 
French and for~ign businesses before her, 
it had to malte nn unltsilling choice for an 
enterprise e~9lu~ively industrial and 
co~mercial . This choice is obviously not 
motivated-by political considerations . 
'rhe sale criterion of the number of 
vehicles depends, in the final analysis, on 
the number of jobs Rssured to F'rcnch 
workers."?3 . . 
' .•.t 
On November JO, 1959, the Lebanese Embassy in Paris 
disclosed that Renault had submitted to the Arab League 
' . . 
Boycott Office i ts proposed letter of cancellation before 
it was sent to Kaiser-Frase~ in I srael . Several days 
later, the u. A. R. newsp~per, §1. Akhbar , reported Renault .· 
had begun negotiations to establish an auto a ssembly plant 
' 
in Egypt, and on December 7, the Gairo Hadio reported 
Henault had committed itself to an investment of :l;i22,400,000 
for construqtion of a new plant . 
. . 
j 
93Quoted in J e-;,ti s h Comrum1 i1;y Jiel8ti~ns Council of 
Grent Philadelp' his Th~ Arab Bo:rco~t :; :1d.· Renault , February 
26 J 1960. J - - ·-- --
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It seems reasonable that Renault cancelled its 
contract with Kaiser-Fraser of Israel in order to be removed 
from the black-list of the Arab League Boycott Office and 
that Renault has also yielded to the Ar ab Boycott. 
The Israeli counter-boycott \'Jas put into operation 
on several occasions. One example is that of the Shell Oil 
Company. The American Jewish War Veteran's Organization 
ca lled for a boycott of that company.94 British Jews, led 
by Zionists, boycotted Shell gasoline stations. 
One maneuver often used \'las to pull into a station, 
wait until an attendant arrived to give service, and then 
pull away \'lith 'a critical remark .95 'rhis campai gn against 
the Shell Oil Company was dropped bY. the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry in a decision t aken following assurance from 
Shell that it ·would i~sure "desirablee sources of oil for 
Israel.96 Another example of the operation of the Israeli 
counter-boycott is that of the Brown and Williamson Tobacco 
Company, which stopped sales of its cigarette, Viceroy , i n 
Israel after Arab pres sures boycotted by Jewish organizations 
in the United St ates, Viceroy sales dropped by almost 19 
94Jewish Observer, A~gust ' 2), 1957, p . 6. 
95Herut, Israel, August 2, 1957, quoted in Periodical 
Bulletin ;~o. 73, Nove mber 4, 195'7, Palestine office, League 
of Arab States. 
96Jewish Observer, ·s eptember 20, 1957, p . - 9. 
per cent 1r.. 19.58, c::.ccorC.inG to a r eport on sc.les of a ll 
cigarette companics.97 Jewi~h sources a~tributed thi& 
sisnificc:mt dc crca.se primarily to the eff'ecti\eness of 
their boycott. . ... 
Implementation of the counter-boycott, however, has 
been hampered by witle disagreement arnont,; the Isr aelis them-
selves as to "Vlhcther this type of policy should. be 
employecl and wl!e.t the gouls of the countez:-boycott should 
be. First of all, when tl)e 1;>oycott commi ttee was formed, 
trere seemed to be no official unanimity about the counter-
•. 
boycott policy. TI1e Finance Ministry seemed to be 
strongly opposed to it.98 I • ' 
Furthermore, \then the Jew·ish Agency decided• to boy-
cott Shell Oil Company in the United States, the Israeli 
Embassy in \!ashington protested such action. The Embassy 
advised Jerusalem to recousider the advisability of a 
publicity campaign. As a result, the Foreign ninistry 
has now, to all intents F..nd purposes, called off the 
campa1gn.99 ) . .. . . 
97The Hatiomil J·e~ish Post and Opinion, Hew l:ork, 
Vol. XIV, No. 19, January 2, 1959. 
98Jewish Observer and ~iddle ~Review, hUgust 23, 
1957, p. 6. ·. 
99Je~Iish Observer and f1iddle East Review 11 Israel 
Drops Anti-~hell Campaign:" September 20, 1957, p. 17. 
98 
Confusion about the intentions of the ~oun~er-boyoott . 
elsa was indicated in the statements of some Israeli leaders 
Although the boycott of ,firms acquiescing _to Arab pressures 
was distinctly named as an area of activity for the counter-
boycott (see footnote .No. 91), the: chai.r•man of the counter-
• I 
boycott committee, Heir Grossman,. h~d this to s~y: 
The Government of .Israel and the Jewish Agency 
have never thought of bOycotting the /~rab 
countrles .or the foreign companies who submit 
to the Arab boycott. Our purpose is to fight 
the Arab aggressi~n · in the economic field by . 
reasoning and by expia1n1ng our attitude, uncovering 
the ~idden goals of the :Arab boycott and 
exposing the efforts of the boycott liaison 
officerf! wl}o stir-up. q~.~ exploit the rnc1al , 
and religious prejudices. If necessery, \'10 wp-6 
take further steps to CO!ilba~ the Arab ·.boycott. 0 
One of' the main re r..t sons for differences among Israeli · 
\ 
leaders ~n the institution ot a . cotn1tcr-~oycott appears 
to be th~ belief that such measures would give the Arabs 
. :-. . '" 
the impression that ~heir boycott was succeeding. 
Hoporting that "-Powe~ful voices both in the 1'reasury and 
the !i"orcign t1iuistry" hnd spoken against the counter-
. . -boycott, "The Jewish Observer wrote: "It would serve only 
- -
to give the Arab boycott both an . undes_erved standing and 
unnecessary publicity. 11101 
lOOLnmerhav (newspaper) '.L'el Aviv, ;.;eptecber 5, 1957, 
quoted in 'periodical B'ulle tin No. 7J, (.;Hiro, t ;ovember 4, 19 5'7, 
p. 10; Palestine Office, League of ~rab ~tates. 
, I 
. 
• • ... l ,!. 
lOlJewish Observer, loc. cit. 
, ,. . . . 
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Although Israelis disagree on using n counter-boycott, 
they have ngreed upon attEloking the Arab. boycott through u 
publicity cflmpaign in the ini"ormation mcdin . 'l'his campaign 
centecs on three main points: (' 
1. ·rhe Arab boycott is an act of a .;gression. 
2. 7he, Arab boycott is. a result of racial and 
religious prejudices activated by the 
establishment r;f · the State of Israel, and 
). Protests to public opinion , governments and 
institutions againot the Arab boycott. 
One good ex£~mple of this ca.r.1pa i g.n 1G a report pu\1l ished. 
in i•'ebruary 19~8 b:i the yrer~ idcntu of Seventeen l1a jor /.meri-
cun Je\ii ~h organiza.tiona under the title • . "Bigotry and. Black-
mai l - u report on the r~rab boycott." It s tated in part: 
The Arab boycot t activities encroach 
upon the elementary American freedom to ; 
trade, to invest v.nd to trDve l ••• k t:ericAn 
citizens in this coun!,ry are questioned 
about their relizian by consulor &!!d 
diplomatic officials of the Arab states. 
American Jews a re denied beca use of their 
religion the privilei;;Cs granted to uon- , 
Jews • •• 
In the broadest sew:se , the Ar a b boycott, 
.1:' .. • .. 1 ~ 
. -
therefore, constitutes politica l and ,. 
economic n6gression. By crea ting and main-
t a ining tension , of neer-~1ar , corttinuelly ·' 
thx-caten1ng world pelice and stability. 
iJhile the boycott lasts, interests vital 
6o Ai!ler ios a r e j e•'>iJO.rd.izect. On polit.icel 
economic and mor al grounds, it must therefore 
be resiste d ~Y t l~e Vn1 ted .~ ta. t c s Government 
by t}perieo.n bus iness ntld by Americnn public 
opinihn . -
• ·.1 -·' 
I· • 
. ' . .. 
.. 
. 
. I 
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In J rmuary 7, 1960 ,1 ·the same org£mization released a 
nell report to the Yiddish and English Jewish .l-'r ess which 
sta ted: .1: . ' l . . , 
~he .i\rab League boycott--" is a form of 
political and economic a~gression that creates 
and maintains tension 1in the Ni ddl:e ~:ast. By 
keep lng the Biddle East in a state of near 
we.r, the ·boyco t;t is a continuing threat to 
world peace. So long as the boycot t lasts, 
interests vital to i~merioa are jeopardized. 
Because ·the boycott imposes unneceosary 
expenditures and enonomic losses upon all the 
countries of the - Middle East, it subverts the 
purposes of the United 3tates economic 
assistance and makes the Middle East more : 
dependent upon such /.merican a id. Ar ab Leggue 
economic warfare therefore place s unnecessary 
an1. a<lditio:nal burdens upon the American 
t axpayer. 
It· is t herefore su~ested that the evils of 
the Arab boycott should be exposed.102 
Confronted with this campaign, the League of ,\rab 
St a tes initiated a counter-publicity campai gn in which it 
endeavored to answer the Zionist charges . Against the first 
point, the Arabs argued tha t the boycott was a defensive 
measure known and accepted as such in internationa l law, 
and practiced in the same way by t he United ~tates against 
Comu1Unis t China. Secondly, !;he Lea6ue denied r acial or 
. 
religious prejudice agd i ns t the Jews. Lastly, it asserted 
that the boycott does not constitute -a threa t to international 
.. , 
cor;u;1ercia l cooperc t ion. 'i'he "boycott was based, it asserted, 
102Conference of Pre s idents of Major America~ Jewish 
Organizations, January 7, 1960. 
101 
on the natural right of everybody to choose the individual or 
company with which he wishes to do business.lOJ 
'rhere is an interesting point of ~peculation on v1hy, 
after beginr1ing a publicity campaign protesting the Arab boy-
cott, Israel has not filed a complaint at the United Nations. 
One strong hypothesis is that the United States ~ould stop 
Israel before she reached the United t,;ations because the 
complaint would reflect upon the American nnd &ationalist 
Chinese blockade of Red China. Then, too, if the complaint 
did reach the United Nations, there is the strong possibility 
that the Afro-Asian block in the General Assembly would h~ve 
enough votes to defeat it.l04 An editorial in the Herut 
party newspaper indicates that while some Israelis have 
considered filing ~uch a complaint at the United Na tions, 
they have failed to act, not because 
• • • this measure wa s doomed to failure because 
of the Soviet veto in the Security Council, or 
because the Arabs would be able to get the neces-
sary votes to throw out the Israeli complaint 
if the case should go to the Assembly, but because 
the Arabs are not expected to change their 
position.l0.5 
lOJBulletin of Secretary-General of ~ League, December 
12, 19.58, pp. 8-10. 
lO~he Ministry of Education, ~ is ~Zionism, Cairo, 
~gypt, 19.56, p. 192. 
10.5Arab League Bulletin, No. 73, November 4, 19.57, p. 
9. (Excerpt from Herut, August 2, 19.57.) 
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CHAPTEll Vlll 
COli'.i'ROVERSlAL . V lB)rJPOlN'fS 
ON THB EFFECTIVENE5~· 0F THE BOYCOT~ 
In order to see more clearly the broad picture of the 
effects of the Arab boycott, the investigator found that most 
.. 
evaluations of, or information on, such effects differ 
I 
s ubstantially according to whet.her the sources ere Israeli or 
r.rabic. It will be helpful, prior to presenting conclusions , 
to discuss first, the Ar ab views on the effectiveness of their 
. . 
action and -secondly, the Israeli views. 
firab sources recognize that it is not easy to inflict a 
serious blow on the Israeli economy as lon~ as Israel can fill 
the gap in her balance of trade with specia l fw1ds pouring in 
from abroad. Hevertheless, Arabs do believe that the -boycott 
has already had its effect on the economic life of Israel, 
and has realized a t least part of its i ntended aim. In 1957 
t.he Main Office. of the 13oycott re por t ed t o .he 3ecret ary 
General or the Arab League that thE~ Israe l i economy wus in a 
. 
state of chaos. 'Prices, the office reported, were going up • • 
flationing an<;t controls dominated the market. An acute 
I 
shortage of raw materia ls existed, the foreign trade deficit 
was widening;· and .the foreign exchange position of the state 
104 
was becoming preca i•ious. There ha d been a uharp decline in 
the va lue of Israeli carrency, and a lo~:.; of oonficlence in 
the stability ot' the cconomy.l06 . . 
In their evaluation of the eff-aces of tho boyco t t. oa 
I srael, the i\ r a bs men tioned ·the follO\.i ing: 
, 
... . 
Ye nr 
1949 
1950 
19.51 
19.52 
Despite all the efforts made by the l srnel1 
Governmeut to 'tif;hten their imports and to 
enc&urage nnd promote exports, lsrael has 
·fulled to bal ance ·her foreign trade. 't he 
following table ' shows the impor~s ·and exports 
arid the annual deficit in her trade ba lance 
in millions of aollars between 1949 and 19,56. 
BALANCE OP 1l'HADE ... 
: ~ · · (Millions of dollars) 
1:x 12ort& & Excess of .iml2orts 
Imports l~e-e.x:gor~s ~ r~xport§, 
. . '. 
2.5J .1 29.7 22).4107 
298.8 )6~9 261.9 
r ~ \,." 
379.8 46.8 JJJ.O 
.. . ,. . - - . 
320.7 4,5.6 27.5.Jl08 
,. . 
. ,( 
106£!. Heport 2ll .!ill£ nctivit!.Y.. of .till£ J1a.Jn orr~~ vf the 
Boycott £2!: itlli. second half Q( 1.2.iQ., the Secretary Geuera l 
J~cport to the 2'/th oe :.Jslon of th~ council vf the Ar a b League • 
l·lnrch 19.5?, pp. J65.;.J66. · ) 
107~acts and 1<'16-ureo, Israel;_O~fice of Infor-L1a t1on, New 
York, 19)5, p. J9 . 
l08lsrael, Governme nt Year~. 571.5 (1954), p. 228. 
1953 
19.54 
19.56 
2. 
286.9 .. ,. .. 59.6 I.. • 227.3109 
J76.6 .. lJ.5.8 240.8 
.529.J 171.) 358 •0110 
1'he value of Israeli currency has suffered 
a sharp decline resulting in inflation. In 
1949, the Israeli pound was equivalent to ; 
the British pound sterling or ~~2 . 8.5; today 
it is equivalent to $0.85. This is a sign which 
indicates that increase .in the value of Israeli 
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exports is only theoretical. ~peaking in terms of 
Israeli currency, the value of exports has in-
creased considerably becuase of the decline in 
value of the Israeli pound. In terms of 
volume, however, there was only a slight 
. 
.. 
increase • 
). The Arab success in stopping the flow of raw 
materials and foodstuffs to Israel from 
neighboring Arab countries has led to a 
sharp rise in the cost of living. It almost 
tripled between 19.51 and 19.58 . fhe following 
table shows this gradual rise: 
l I 
109Israel, Government Year Book, {1957}, p. · lJ7. 
llOisrael. Government Year Hook, 1718, (19.57), p. 108 . 
• J t ... 
-~ 
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CONSUMERS ! Plil~E INDEX . \ . ! (. .. , . 
{Base: September 19.51-lOO h . 
September '~ 19.51 10.0 ' 
\ t 1952 .. , . . 1.5J 
. .. 19.53 . . 196. 
19.5!+ 220 
• 1 19.5.5 233 
19 . .56 248 
August 
- '~>• 'c. .. • 19.57 264111 
4. Due to the ' continuing rise in the cost of 
I 
living, the Israeli Government employees and 
workers continued to deroand higher wages. '£he 
Israeli press' regularly contains items about 
strikes and demonstrations by workers. Some 
factories have had to lay off part of their 
o ._ - '" I • ( 
l abor force because of the high cost of 
. ' production and the l ack of a ready market 
. \ (,, (.; 
to absorb their products. Other factories 
, 
or business ventures had to close down 
entirety. 
. . 
• 4.. • ! 
This had led to an increase in unemployment 
. 
with wf.lich neither the. g~;ve rnmeJ?.t · nor. th~ •i , '. 
:. ,.· . 
• I. 
--- -· ..... 
. , 
- •• ·- "., ::1..' 
. . 
llls tatistical Bulletin of ' Israel (English Summa.cy ), 
Septembe~ ! 9.58, Vol. IX, No. 9;-p. 338. · 
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labor agencies could cope. As is often the case, 
this crisis · in unemployment resulted 'in,tsooial 
problems. tlany unemployed workers resorted· .to 
pilfering, robbing, and v~rious other crimes. The 
statisU:1oal abstracts and the reports of the 
l4iniatry of' · Police reveal and incroasing rate of 
crime in :rsrael.ll2· · . . , : . 
.5. The Arab pressure on foreign companies which 
invested in 'Israel, established brE111ches there, 
or helped ' in any ·way to build the Israeli 
economy, led to the \'11 thdra.wal of many companies 
and changes in the plans of others.ll3 
Tightening of boycott rules concerninG foreign passenger 
and cargo ships, not · allowing them to stop in an Arab country 
if they had visited Israel, led to ·a rise in the costs of 
shipping to and from Israel. In a report, "Bigotry and Black-
mail,• the presidents ot major Jewish organizations in the 
United States acknowledged this fact and reported that the 
American b':xport Lines, for example, must at a considerable 
expenditure of time· and money operate a separate Middle East 
service to the Israeli ·ports of Haifa and Tel Aviv. 
1 : , :::J , n · 
' . 
112! Uepor~ 2n ~ ~ctivity of ~ tlllln Office 2( ~ 
Arab Boycott for~~~ of~. 1~e Jccretary General's 
~eport to the Council 2£ the Arab Lengue During ~ ~ · 
Session, ~arch 1957, pp. 36.5-5667 
- . w. 
113Ib1d., for the first half of 19.57, August 1957, pp. 
7-8. 
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ln the c~ne of for~ign, air line companies, Israel 
suffered the sama trouple. .IJ! sp~ te of its strategic loca tion 
between three continents, l!:urope, Asia and•.Africa, lsraol could 
not achieve her hope of 9eCOflling · t l1e international a ir cross-
road between the East and West. The Ara b countries forbade 
. 
planes using Israeli airports from flying over Arab , territory 
. . 
• 4 I • 
or from receiving flight .1nformat.i~;m or services from Arab 
.. 
sources. 
Turning to the Israeli sou~ces, unfortunately, ·the 
investigator found that the~ are almost entirely silent on the 
subject of the Ar~b boycott. Even the most painstaking 
studies of Israeli publications, both official and unofficial, 
fails to reveal Israeli's own assessment of the boycott and 
its effects. T~is paucity .of relevant material could 
possibly be inte~preted as indicating at least some effective-
nes s of the boycott. 
. . : 
It is poss~ble, however, . to get a certain idea of their 
views from ~r.ticles arid editorials, in Israel's leading news-
papers • . !.. ' ~ ,. ,, .. . ' 
The Arab boycott is generally pictured by most Israelis 
as a failure. In their opinion, the boycott has not had 
serious ef(ects on the ~Israeli economy and has not accomplished 
its aim~ A good exampl~ -of this view point is provided in 
. ·' 
I • I: 
the .March 2?,~ 1959 issue of the Jewish Observer~ ~iddle 
East Review. 
--
In 'the article descrlb1ng the boycott as the "Arab 
Double-Edged Weapon," Dav'id' R'o'asone1 wrote: · ,•·. . " 
The use of economic boycott in' the Arab 
\~orld, however, h~s not generally been so 
sporadic and incidental.; It has been a conl .. : 
sistent instrument of policy. Surprisingly, it 
has ' nQt been d1rect~d only against Israel, but 
also to a growing degree, against Hestern 
countries. · As far as Israel is concerned, the 
Arab boyoott, when fir~t initiated had damaging 
effects ' on the Jewish economy in Palestine, 
but even since 1948 the losses which have been 
inflicted upon the Arab countries in export-
proceeds, in customs nnd oil revenues have 
far o~twcighed the losses incurred by lsrael.ll4 
G. l1eran asserts in an article entitled, 11The Arab 
Boycott and ito Econocic Effect,• 
•• :that after the creation of the state of 
Israel, the Arab states lost more e.s a result of 
the boycott than did Israel. Israel exports 
mainly citrus and diamonds, t i<<JO products for 
which the ; rab countries hardly provide a 
market. li'or its industrial exports, on the 
other hand, if -they were competitive at \'IOrld 
prices, Israel would always find Westorn Europe 
hard-currency· marltets more lucrative. 
Only in one aspect· might the Arab boycott 
prove damaging to Israel. If Israel succeeds in 
diverting its export trade more and more from 
Europe to Asia anu Africa, it may find the 
blockade of its regular shipping services, 
through the Suez Canal and through the ati~rnative 
route · or the Gulf of Elath, tbreatening. ., 
·-
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114navid Hocsone, "Boycott Arab's 
Jewish Observer ~ Middle ~Review, 
Double-Edged "o·leapon," 
Herch 27, 1959, p. lJ. 
• •• f 
115G. Heron, n~he Arab Boycott's 
Effects," ~ Economic Quarterll• Vol. 
'."-~ .. . ' . .• 
1 
and its Economic 
!, No. ), J anuary, 1954. 
I ' ' . ' 
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A more recent Israeli definition of the failure of the 
boycott was given in a new qook published by the Israel 
I 
, . 
Office of Information in New York which stated: 
• ~ t t. • .. ; 
Nearly eleven years of Arab economic warfare 
have not checked Israel's economy and ·the pos-
sibility of its infliction of vital injury 1~ 
slight. It has been a weapon of spite rather 
than a serious danger., to Israel development. In 
some respe·cts rt has even served to stimulate 
Israel's economic progress by encouraging a 
larger agricultural output and th"e discovery of new 
export markets. 
The boycott aggravates and perpetuates 
tension, and flouts the principles of economic 
international, intercourse. It endangers the peace 
of the world,· because boy~ott and blockade are 
instruments of warfare.llo 
I , I 
Despite this prevailing view of the boycott, some 
economic expe~ts' voices are heard now and then acknow-
ledging the effects of ·the boycott. In an article under the 
title, ncan Israe~ Support Herself? 11 1 ... an ~sraeli, Oded Remla, 
wrote that: 11 The Arab boycott cos~ the Israeli economy an 
estimated $40 million ann~~lly, in ~he~~ier . ~xpens~s for 
importing oil, in denial o~ .nea~by market aqd souPces of 
supply, .and in _other ways •. ull7 , . 
.• • t ... 
.. 
. " 
(' 
Yet other ~Israelis deny an economic effect of the boy-
. " 
cott, while admitting a political one. 
\,, ... f .. '-
I I 
Haboker, an , ~sra.eli 
.. 
• 
... , , \ 
116Israel Office of Information, Israel's Strugr,le £2!: 
Peace, Marstin Press, Inc., New York, 1960, p. 87. 
117ocie&· Remla, Can ·.Israel -suppoZ:t rierself?, Commentary, 
flew York, ~~ovember- 19.56, ! P·. 4J3. ' · 
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daily newspaper asserted that: 
.. • 
Tho Jewish exoerts in Israel think that the saccess 
ot the r rab bOycott has more political repercussions 
than economic, and whatever success it accomplishes 
will have a direct effect on the poss1b111t1es of 
concludin~ pence between Israel and the Ar ab States.ll8 
While it is difficult to estimate .the exact damage 
inflicted upon Israeli economic life, it can hardly be denied 
that the boycott hns resulted in definite problems for Israel. 
For example: l . .. •' 
1. Israel and world Zionism \'lcre upset by the 
effects of the Arab boycott to the extent tha t, • 
after years of publicly ignoring it, · they have 
'J discussed it in public and in several Jewish 
conventions with the resulting decision to 
initiate a counter .. boycott. · l·.• 
' ·.' I i'' 
2. Emigra tion from Israel has gradually increased, 
startling the Israelis who never expected such 
a reversal. Early in 1957 the Israeli Director of 
Immigration Affairs announced that: 
The number of Jews who arrived in Israel since 
the e stablishment of the State was 8)5,000 at the 
end or 1956. ' There are 50,000 Jews in lsrael who 
did not apply for lsraeli citizenship, preferring 
to keep their original nationalities. These Jews 
represent J per cent of the population of Israel. 
The : ~umber ~of Jews who emigrated from Israel 
ll~Haboker, Israel. Sepce~ber 5, 1957, cited by 
Perio~ical .. ~lletin !2,. ll, ~ovember 4, :~9.5? 1 p.· 5, Palestine Office1 League of Arab States. · · ' 
. 
:::: ~·. .. ... 
. . . : . 
... a ....... _ 
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since the establishm'!nt of the ~tate until the end 
of 1956 is about 70,090,- or 8.5 per ceut , of the 
Jews who 1mmigra ted t;o Is~ae l. It is to . be ugted 
tha t the number of newcomers to -Israel who emigr ated 
is only 5 pe~ cent of the total number 9r em1grru1ts . 
'I'his means that most of those who left l.sruel urc 
original inhabitant~ and this is very disturbing.ll9 
'The emi.grntion of such a ,large number of, Jews from 
Israel. and eapec1nlly from amo!l.(; . the "Sabras," that is, Jews 
native to the oountPy, appears to be due to dissatisfaction 
with economic and social conditions. According to Arab 
. 
sources, this situation prompted the Iaraelil.Government on 
January 1, 1959, to · appropriate a special fund for extennive 
I 
research on t the immigration problem to be undertaken by a 
group of experts from the Hebrew University in Jex•usalem.l20 
). That the . Israeli economy is in a shaky 
condition appears clearly in the information 
and. statistics released by the Government ·of 
Israel in official documents ~nd in other. 
\.' 
, Zionist· publications. An Israeli economic 
expert, in the Jewish Obsel"Ver. analyzing a 
United llationa l~eport, ~The Developmen t of 
fl,anufaeturing .lndustry 1n Egypt, .. Israel, and 
Turkey, • wrote : 
. ' 
• t • .• 
. '
'rhere is no longer any s urprise when i nte rnat ional 
experts, confoonted with the fact s of Israel's 
ll~noport of 1bQ. !:iecre t a ry. GeHerl;11 Q[ ~ ~ .... eague 
~_ the Counc1l·!B 1ts 27th Sess1on, . Ca1ro, March, 19.57. pp. 
~oJ-264. '• · · ·' · 
120Bulletin 2( tna Main Office 2£ the Boycott, No. 207/5 9, 
Dcuna.scus, January 2.5, 19.59. 
~-
economic life i- throw up their hands in horror 
and proclaim it impossible. r• study carried out by 
the Stanford Research Institute in 1955 concluded 
that labour productivity in Israel is perhaps 
only about 50 per cent of tha t in many industrial 
nations and probably in the vicinity of 25 per. 
cent of productivity in the United ~ta tes. 
At the same time, wages in Israel are in some 
cases higher than in several more industrialized 
couijtries, including Germany. Average hourly 
earnings in manufacturing during 1954 were 48 cents 
in Israel, 40 cents in Germany, )8 in France, 27 in 
-Turkey, and 23 in Japan. Profits , on the othe r hand, 
are low according to the United Nations report. The 
situation in Israel has become an increas ingly 
serious problem. The Stanford Research Institute 
stated: 'There is only a modest amount of business 
profits in the aggrega te in the vlhole of Israel. • 
This suggests that many industrial enterprises are 
probably suffering losses.l21 
In a 1956 survey of Israel, the co~nittee of Foreign 
Affa irs in the House of Representatives reported that: 
At present, Israel produces 70 per cent of 
her food. Israel can not yet pay her own way. It 
can only hope to mainta in itself fully if it can 
develop its industry and export the products of 
its skill and technology to other na tions, without 
the economic boycott which restricts her ut the 
present time.l22 
It must be noted t hat the re were some factors which 
helped the Arab boycott and played an important role in 
weakening the Israeli economy. In no way related to the 
boycott apparatus, these factors included the strain of 
llJ 
121Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, February 16, 
1959, p. 13. 
12284th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Ca lendar No_ 588, 
House Re port No. 168), lleport of the Study Mission to Europe. 
--
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providing for large numbers , of i mmi grants and the great 
expenditures resulting from a·~.:-policy of maintaining 1a large 
standing army. These .are discussed in detail below. · . · ·· 
1. Jewish i~nigration to Israel: It is estamated 
that 934,000 J.ewish immigrants ar~ived in 
• 1 n. Israel between f1ay 15, 1948, and t!le end of 
1958. This mass immigration ~ required a 
. · substantial increase ia government ~ spen~ing, 
the more so since jobs had to be provided for 
the ne~1comers, few of .whom arrived with e.ny 
means .of their o~m. For all the generosity of 
\Wrld Jewry, contributions .from abroad did not ' 
. · cover this cost. Consequently, a large portion 
of .the country's income, which should have J 
. .. ! l 
. . 
·,. been utilized. on building the economy, was 
spent .on immigrants. · I ~ • 
2. The Israeli .policy of maintaining a l a rge 
standing army: The defense budget, the total 
of \'lhich has always .. been secret, and I s raeli 
labpr power were both drained by a standing 
army with large reserves constantly called 
out for drill or emergencies, and by the time 
devoted to guard duty i .n the border settlements. 
Military expenditures , the refore , took a 
. rurth~~~ tot~l _of th~ country's resources. 
.. , 
11.5 
On the other hana.. there ·11a::, one f tsctor which bolstered 
the Israeli . 'eeor,omy and th~ireby hiudared the effectiveness of 
the Arab boycott. ·this faco t r wa~ the flow of cs pitel from 
abroad~ 
; 
-. • " I ~ ,& ' . " ., 1 a • "'. I I > 
Isrti.el •s· balnnce of trAde 1Uh0)fl3 an annual deficit of ~350 
mill1on.l2J 1£hiu gup .is mad~ up partially by s ;pecial funds 
from abroad totaling $26.5 to ~280 millioa. a year. 'l'h.ese funds 
include German reparations, German r(?.Gtit.utlon paymer1t to 
Jewif.>h families, annuul donation!3 from Je\~S abro~d , ;;;ale or 
State of Israel 2onds abroad, c.ud remittances from ·foreign 
Jews to relabives .in Israel . 1l'ha tota l irlflux of capital in 
the periou bet~cen 194~-1957 amounted to $2.5 b1llion.l24 
l)espite the cons1etel'able, but limited, succes~ which 
the .~rabs have realized · ir.. thelr boycott of Isr.c!iel, tho Arab 
League auffered a r..umber or failures which aided Israel. 
First of sll , ·the : Arabs ~ fuiled to oto~ the flow of funds 
1n aid\ and donations to Iurnel, especially f1•om the United 
States. 1 1~gardlesG of .ull tho pre~sure they applied to stop 
this·, tho flow of capital continued. . ' 
. . . s econdly, they {ailed to prevent lest Germcuy from 
payin~ lsrl1el ~822 million in reparation~ Jlnd sub.ut-antial 
. t • . .. 
l 23new York Times, January 15, 1959, ft!srael 1 G Budget 
Raises Outlays.• 
124oeoffery !) • .Paul "Fucing Is-rael' s Economic Chulle.age. a 
Jev1ah Obsen•ver Md ~liddle East Review, Februarv 6, 19~9 ,·· pp. 
14-lS. - - "' ~ 
---
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amounts in restitution payments to Jewish familie~. 
.. ... f •• 
Thirdly, , t~e Araps fa}l~~ to prev~nt Isreel from using 
the Gulf ··~f Aqaba. ~ay, thus ~na.bling the Israelis tp. us~ their 
southern . port .of Elath, , wh.ich unti~ then had been blockaded by 
the Arabs... Through Elath, Israel \'IUD, for the first time, able 
... 
to contact the Asian and Africe.n countries from whom she acquired 
some of her needs in raw materials in exchange for her mRnu-
f actured goods. 
A primary r eason for these f a ilures ma y be the influence 
of world Zionism and its strong grip on most media of 
information, as \'lell a s the pres sure Zionists could exert on 
international and local political and economic ins titutions • 
. 
Such Zionist pressure is quite understandable since, if the 
ti.rabs should succeed in their boycott, .it would be a matter 
' 
of life or death for Israel; Therefore, Zion ists have 
.. 
fought with grea t determination. 
Future prospects for any major changes in the boycott 
I , • . . 
appear to be negligible. The tendency among the A~ab states 
today is to tighten the boycott. The Arab League ha s 
instructed the main office ' of the boycott to speed up 
-measures in every respect. 
' I J As a r~sult of this stricter applica tion of boycott .. 
measures, the United Arab llepublic, which used to forbi~ 
.. ' ·' . 
foreign vessels_:· from carrying only petroleum or other 
s tra§egic .good~ ., through the Suez Canal to, or from, Israel 
. . 
II 
--
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embarked upon a policy of nlso '·f'orbiuding all or arty Israeli 
goods in forai&n ve osels from us ing the canal. During 
February ana i·!e.rch, 19.59, Onited Arab Republic authorities 
detained. three foreign ves.sels a.au seized their cargoes of 
Israel cement, potash, and sera}) iron.l2.5 
Tile success or failure of the J~rab ooyco-c t in' the future 
will depend, of !oours<:!, upon the continued :.:tupport. whlch 
Israel received from abroad, anu upon t he ~eneral political 
development of tho Middle E~st. -
Addrosaing a Jqapai }Ja.rty meeting 1 the former Israeli 
Commander-in-chief. ~'larned tht~t: 
Israel's hone.rmooa Kith t:.he Wast mignt be nearing 
its end. The facts n0\1/ ha ve to be f etced tha t a 
repproachment between l;he ~est and the ,\rabs ' \il:1.S 
likely to happen and the Israelis htid to be 
prepa-red for consequently harciel.~ times and 
dangerous situat1ons.l26 
Some of Israel's external uources of income a r e ~ .. lreudy 
exhausted. 'l"'hese include the $1J5 million in export-import 
bank l .oans, the ~ $100 million in sterling bal ances, anu ~15 
million in foreign securities held by Israelis.l27 ~orne other 
major sources on which Israe l is no~>~ relying to fiu~ncc 
i2.5~ York :.i'i rnes , Harch 27, 1959, "Isrue~ ~ecs Lostl in 
Suez Ship Bun. • 
J26'!Duye .. n l::ar~1.s: 'Jest Nuy 'i'urn," Jewish Observe£ !!ill!. 
Hiuule Eaot HeviC\i, Docambe.r 19, 1958, p. 12. 
1.270ded tio rJlu, "Cnn l~rael ...iupport :-iersc lf '?," t;omr.1ea t.ao, 
~e•·z York, rlovembe.r, -1956, pp. 4J8-4J9. • 
': 
-.. --
economic development would no ~longer be av~ilable within a 
number of years. Grru1ts from tho Unite d ~tutes have been 
declining from ~85 million in 1952 to $J6.6 million in 1955 
to $7.5 million in 1959. In the next fisca l yea r no United 
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States aid is planned at all since Israel has been removed 
from the United St ates foreign aid progru~.l28 Del iveries to 
Israel of ~822 million in goods and serv~ces i s d ue to 
expire by 1967, depending on the r ate of annual deliveries. 
i1ore than one -half of t he t ot <:.l has a l ready been used. 
For t he Arabs., the boyco tt .i..r.; j ust one <ispect of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. I'hey i ntend t o contine.e i t until a 
solution is reuched for the v;hole Palestine lJroblera. For the 
Arab people the boycott has as sumed ~ symbol ic aspect of the 
struggle between them and the I sraeliG. 'J?hey i ntend to force 
Israel to accept the United Nations re solutions t·Thich she first 
accepted but has continuous ly repudi a t ed , and ~o insure the 
repatriation of t.hof:le ;,rab refugees who '.·mnt to r eturn "to their 
homes with f a ir compensation t o those ·Nho wish to settle 
elsewhere. 
If, as pre sently seems the case, Isr aeli sources of 
economic aid continue to G.windle, the Arab boyco~t \.'/ill 
undoubtedly loom as an even lir euter de t e rren t to Isr aeli 
economic growth ru1d survi va l. I t is possible tha ~ Israe l may 
128" Directed United St ates Help to Israel .Ending," ~ 
York Time s , April 5, 1959. 
I . -·--
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have to limit or stop furthe l:" J ewish i moi gration for 'l.•!ant of 
resources to provide for them. 'lb 0n , i f no new sources of 
economic aid, which IsrDel needs for ba l ancing her budget, 
are (orthcoming, she mis ht well be forced to meet Ar ab decands 
in order to end the boycott. ·However-, only the future holds 
an answer to such speculations . 
I 
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.. ~· CHAPTEH L'\ 
SUI1!t;AHY AUD CONCLUSION 
./ .. 
l~e purpose of this thesis wns to describe anti discuss 
the .\rab boycott of Israel inclu.iillti its goals, its structure 
and its operations, in add! tion to the Israeli and Zionist 
reaction to it. 
In order to unders t and ·t.his problem it 1m s thought 
advisable to intrQduce the firs t t\iO chapters in the thesis 
with a brief accoW1t of the recent hiBtory of Pa lestine ana 
the Arab Lcague, . discussing the mnin cauaes of t;hc conflict 
between the .\rabs and the Jews. 
In addition to the Balfour D~claral;ion of 1917, the 
Palestine .Haudate ,,..,;;;.s d iscus sed, the l a tter be ing the uirect 
consequence of the former • 
. • In regard to the Arab League (the regional organization 
of the Arab States) the author discussed the Alexandria 
Conference of 1944, which delineated the outlines of the Arab 
League. 'file pact of the League was signed in C.:::.iro on the 
22n March, 1945, by the revrescnta tive of seven !1ra b S t e!tes . 
'fhe machinery of the Leabrue consists of a council, a number 
or special committees arA u permanent secretariat. On the 
I' 
--
1.(.;2 
I 
council each s t u te has one vote . '.i.'ht;, co:.mcil [il.S.Y meet in any 
/,rab Capitalo. r·t~ funct.i.ons lucl;...clt;s mediaz1cn of d l s j:.utcs 
• •I 
betl-tcen any of che ~ague states or with a countr,1 out ::; ide 
the League. '.lhe council has a 1>011 clcal com.-·nit tee 'consi & ting 
. . . 
of Foreign l'linistE;.rs of ~he J..rab !:.tote~.;. 11e;noorship in the 
' " League is oper.~. ~o a.n:y i nde.tJ&llilaut :~rab St<::te. 
... r:..... ) 
Chaptert~ three u;.d. four a.iscus sed. tl:c i.r:~b 1Joycot t a.t:td 
t. • 
the bo;tt;O \; t; vf t he Je\.'1~ iu l 'ule~t;lr..c , undho~-= t t o b~ycott \·Ias 
I~ 
end its godls ? ·.ihy d.o t he .\r~ou r egu!"C.. it. as a defens ive 
measure ubt.:.i.ast ls:.~uc l? :'h~ l:.or:;.eli refu$al to irnplc ~:crit the · 
l • \,. . I • _,.,., \ • • 
Uni t ed !~atilCJns llesolui.iun of 19!.:.·7 ~ ....tJ.-:1 t heir .i:'~eventillJ the 
ret~n of the million 1\r u"b rofu3eef..; frur.~ Palestine to their 
' 
original hvtilC! B were the ma jor causou of t h-3 :.r .;b boycott. In 
the light or thi~, the Ar a.b :t~tcs . ~ilvisugcd the ccoaom1c 
;·'I ' 
boycott of Isruel as t heonl:r defensive neu.surc ag.:-1 ins t 
Israeli expans ion. 
r.l..'he two stages tha t the boycoct' i·o.n t hl'uUGh .we.::-e 
' . j)resented. The firt.>t stage , \'lith limited gouls f.1nd means , 
• l \ . 
we s begun in 191}5 during t he dayG of the Sri t ish ~i;.illdtl te. It 
• .... ~ I r • '"" ,.,. 
was directed t oi;;urda the Jet'IS of Palestine. ?ne second stage • 
... _11 t,: II !.X. f 
~lhich was actuully only a con;;.iriua ti'->n -if t :a:J fir~:; t , \ia n 
o ,_) l I I 
directed· a.gainti t lSl"f!e l. I' ----" f~\,..· ·: Chap ter five and six dealt with the boycott of I s rael 
a.ntl its opera tion. 
. "i:Jtl .. F' { • 
12J 
upon the prohibition of all ~commercial rela tions between Iprael 
r-u -~ '- • -
and the member states of the Ar ab Le ague. This applied to t he 
importing of agriculturol goo.ds or any manufactured or other 
f ': • I 
commodities from Israel to the Ar ab countries and to the 
1 
'; • l I 
export to Israel of raw materials and foods. 
~ 
'.fhe different 
·~ 
forms the boy~ott took were described in great detail. ~o 
.. ,, ., i 
were the methq~s applied by the . Arab i.e ague in general and 
"'' . . • J - •• 
individual Arab ~tates in particula r. 
Chapters seven and eibht dealt with the Israeli r e action 
to the boycott and the controversia l viewpoint as to the 
effectiveness of the boycott. Hecognizing that an exclus ively 
Arab verdict might be biased, a number of Israeli source s 
and records were consulted and quoted from and the 
pertinence of such material was remarked upon. Da t a were also 
given on the Israeli counte r-boycott. While the Israeli and 
Arab assessments of t he Arab Boycott Movemement obviously 
greatly differ, the da t a supplied should enable the reade r 
to form a f airly accura te picture of the main i s sue . 
The conclusion drawn from t he extensive materia l con-
tained in this thesis indicates that the Ar ab boycott has 
been indeed effective. While at the present t i me it is difficult 
to estimate the exact damage infl icted upon Israeli economic 
life, there would seem no doubt t hat the boycott created 
some gr ave economic problems for Israel. Mention was a lso 
made of several partial f ailures on the part of the Ar ab 
boycott-organizers. 
----
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Since the boycott still continues, it is obviously impos -
sible to give a final verdict on its success or f a ilure. It 
is, however, hoped that the deta iled discussion of the entire 
boycott operation, with all the relevant pol~tical and econo-
mic data, may enable the student of the present t e nsions in 
the Middle East gain a much clearer comprehension of the 
forces primarily responsible for these tensions. 
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